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Despite extensive research on cryptography, secure and efficient query processing over outsourced data remains an open challenge.
This paper continues along with the emerging trend in secure data processing that recognizes that the entire dataset may not be
sensitive, and hence, non-sensitivity of data can be exploited to overcome limitations of existing encryption-based approaches. We,
first, provide a new security definition, entitled partitioned data security for guaranteeing that the joint processing of non-sensitive
data (in cleartext) and sensitive data (in encrypted form) does not lead to any leakage. Then, this paper proposes a new secure
approach, entitled query binning (QB) that allows secure execution of queries over non-sensitive and sensitive parts of the data.
QB maps a query to a set of queries over the sensitive and non-sensitive data in a way that no leakage will occur due to the joint
processing over sensitive and non-sensitive data. In particular, we propose secure algorithms for selection, range, and join queries to
be executed over encrypted sensitive and cleartext non-sensitive datasets. Interestingly, in addition to improving performance, we
show that QB actually strengthens the security of the underlying cryptographic technique by preventing size, frequency-count, and
workload-skew attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have witnessed the emergence of several public clouds (e.g., Amazon Web Services, Google APP
Engine, and Microsoft Azure) as the dominant computation, storage, and data management platform. Many small to
medium size organizations, including some large organizations such as Netflix, have adopted the cloud model shifting
their data management task to the cloud. The cloud offers numerous advantages including the economy of scale, low
barriers to entry, limitless scalability, and a pay-as-you-go model. While benefits abound, a key challenge from data
owners’ perspective – that of “losing” control over one’s data – still plagues the cloud model. In addition, the threat of
“insider attacks” is also realistic, loss of control can lead to significant security, privacy, and confidentiality concerns.
Such concerns are not a new revelation — indeed, they were identified as a key impediment for organizations adopting
the database-as-as-service model in early work on data outsourcing [36]. Since then, the security/confidentiality
challenge has been extensively studied in both the cryptography and database literature. Existing work on data security
can be broadly categorized into the following three categories:
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(1) Encryption based techniques. These techniques include order-preserving encryption (OPE) [5], deterministic encryp-
tion [12], non-deterministic encryption [32], homomorphic encryption [29], bucketization [36], searchable encryp-
tion [18, 68], and distributed searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) [40]). In addition, encryption-based techniques
resulted in the following secure database systems: CryptDB [61], Monomi [72], TrustedDB [11], CorrectDB [10],
SDB [78], ZeroDB [23], L-EncDB [46], MrCrypt [70], Crypsis [69], Arx [60]. Likewise, Cypherbase [6], Microsoft
Always Encrypted, Oracle 12c, Amazon Aurora [1], and MariaDB [2] are industrial secure encrypted databases.
(2) Secret-sharing (SS) [65] based techniques. Examples of which include distributed point function [30], function
secret sharing [13], accumulating-automata [21, 22], secure secret-shared MapReduce [22], OBSCURE [35], and
others [25, 47, 51]. In this category, two emerging industrial systems are: Pulsar1 based on function secret-sharing and
Jana [9] based on non-deterministic, order-preserving encryption and secret-sharing.
(3) Trusted hardware-based techniques. They are either based on a secure coprocessor or Intel Software Guard Exten-
sions (SGX) [17] that allow decrypting data in a secure area at the cloud and perform the computation on decrypted data.
However, the secure coprocessor reveals access-patterns. Cipherbase [6, 7] CorrectDB [10], VC3 [64], Opaque [76],
HardIDX [28], EnclaveDB [62], Oblix [54], Hermetic [79], and EncDBDB [27] are secure hardware-based systems.
Despite significant progress, a cryptographic approach that is both secure (i.e., no leakage of sensitive data to the
adversary) and efficient (in terms of time) simultaneously has proved to be very challenging. Existing solutions suffer
from the following limitations:
• Non-scalability. Cryptographic approaches that prevent leakage, e.g., fully homomorphic encryption coupled with
oblivious-RAM (ORAM) [31, 58] or secret-sharing, simply do not scale to large data sets and complex queries. Most of
the above-mentioned techniques do not work well, when deployed on a large-scale dataset, due to the high overheads
of the techniques. For example, executing a selection query on 1M TPC-H LineItem table took (i) 22 seconds using
secret-sharing based techniques [22], (ii) 797 seconds using multiparty computation-based industrial database system,
namely Jana [9], and (iii) 13 seconds using Intel SGX-based Opaque [82], while executing the same query on cleartext
data took only 0.0002 seconds.
• Unclear security properties. Systems such as CryptDB have tried to take a more practical approach by allowing
users to explore the tradeoffs between the system functionality and the security it offers. Unfortunately, precisely
characterizing the security offered by such systems given the underlying cryptographic approaches has turned out to be
extremely difficult. For instance, [42, 55] show that when order-preserving and deterministic encryption techniques
are used together, on a dataset (in which the entropy of the values is not high enough), an attacker might be able to
construct the entire plaintext by doing a frequency analysis of the encrypted data.
• Vulnerability to other security attacks. Many of the above-mentioned cryptographic techniques/systems are also
susceptible to the following attacks:
(1) Output-size attack: An adversary having some background knowledge can deduce the full/partial outputs by simply
observing the output sizes [82]. All the above techniques/systems, except bucketization [37], are prone to output-size
attacks.
(2) Frequency attack: An adversary can deduce how many tuples have an identical value [55] based on the output of
the query. Order-preserving encryption [5], searchable encryption [68], and secure hardware-based techniques [6,
7, 10, 20, 62, 64, 71, 82] are prone to frequency-count attacks, during query execution. In addition, deterministic
encryption [12] reveals the frequency of a word, even without executing a query.
(3) Access-pattern attack: An adversary can know the addresses of encrypted tuples that satisfy the query [16]. Private
information retrieval (PIR) [16], oblivious-RAM (ORAM) [31], oblivious transfers [39, 63], and secret-sharing-
based techniques [13, 21, 25, 30, 43, 51, 65, 75] are not prone to access-pattern attacks.
(4) Workload-skew attack: An adversary, having the knowledge of frequent selection queries by observing many queries,
can estimate which encrypted tuples potentially satisfy the frequent selection queries. Except access-pattern-hiding
techniques, all the cryptographic techniques are prone to workload-skew attack (we will discuss workload-skew
attack in detail in §5.5).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no cryptographic technique that prevents all the four attacks on a skewed dataset.
Our contribution. While the race to develop cryptographic solutions that (i) are efficient, (ii) support complex SQL
queries, (iii) offer provable security from the application’s perspective is ongoing, this paper departs from the above
well-trodden path by exploring a radically different (but complementary) approach to secure data processing in the
1https://www.stealthsoftwareinc.com/
cloud. Our approach is intended for situations when only part of the data is sensitive, while the remainder (that may
consist of the majority) is non-sensitive.
In particular, we propose a partitioned computation model that exploits such a classification of data into sensitive/non-
sensitive subsets to develop efficient data processing solutions with provable security guarantees. In partitioned
computing, sensitive data is outsourced in an appropriate encrypted form, while non-sensitive data can be outsourced in
cleartext form. Partitioned computing, potentially, provides significant benefits by (i) avoiding (expensive) cryptographic
operations on non-sensitive data, and (ii) allowing query processing on non-sensitive data to exploit indices. Such
indices (that cannot be easily supported alongside encryption-based mechanisms in a non-interactive setting) are a key
mechanism for efficient query processing in traditional database systems.2
While partitioned computing offers new opportunities for efficient and secure data processing on the cloud, it raises
a new security challenge (§2) – of leakage, due to the joint processing of the encrypted (sensitive) dataset and of the
plaintext (non-sensitive) datasets. We refer to this security challenge as partitioned data security challenge. Our work
will formalize the security definition that will drive the development of the proposed prototype, entitled PANDA (to
refer to PArtitioN DatA). In PANDA, we develop a query processing technique, entitled query binning (QB) to prevent
leakage of sensitive data due to the simultaneous execution of sensitive and non-sensitive data. In addition, PANDA
extends QB to answer selection, range, and join queries. We will, also, show two interesting effects of using PANDA:
(1) By avoiding cryptographic processing on non-sensitive data, the joint cost of communication and computation of Panda’s
QB is significantly less than the computation cost of a strongly secure cryptographic technique3 (e.g., homomorphic
encryptions, or secret-sharing-based technique [22, 35] that hides access-patterns — the identity of the tuple satisfying
the query) on the entire encrypted data; and hence, QB improves the performance of strong cryptographic techniques
over a large-scale dataset (§6).
(2) PANDA’s QB provides enhanced security by preventing several attacks such as output size, frequency-count, and
workload-skew attacks, even when the underlying cryptographic technique is susceptible to such attacks (§5.6).
Outline. The primary contributions of this paper and its online are as follows:
(1) The partition computation model and inference attack due to the joint processing over sensitive and non-sensitive data
(§2).
(2) A formal definition of partitioned data security when jointly processing sensitive and non-sensitive data (§3).
(3) An efficient QB approach (§4) that guarantees partitioned data security, supporting cloud-side-indexes, and that can be
built on top of any cryptographic technique.
(4) Methods to deal with join queries, range queries, insert operation, and workload-skew attacks (§5).
(5) A weak cryptographic technique (e.g., cloud-side indexable techniques [24, 60, 66]) becomes secure and efficient when
mixed with QB (§5.6).
(6) Experimental evaluation of PANDA under different settings and queries (§6).
Conference version. A preliminary version of this paper was accepted and presented in IEEE ICDE [53]. The
conference version includes the following additional concept, which is not provided in this version, due to space
restriction: an analytical model to show when QB works better compared to a pure cryptographic technique (§ V.A
of [53]).
2The sensitive and non-sensitive data classification, which is common in industries for secure computing [3, 4] and done via appropriately using
existing techniques surveyed in [26]; for example, (i) inference detection using graph-based semantic data modeling [38], (ii) user-defined relationships
between sensitive and non-sensitive data [67], (iii) constraints-based mechanisms, (iv) sensitive patterns hiding using sanitization matrix [44], and (v)
common knowledge-based association rules [45]. However, it is important to mention here that non-sensitive data can, over time, become sensitive
and/or lead to inferences about sensitive data. This is an inevitable risk of the approaches that exploit sensitive data classification. Note that all the
above-mentioned work based on sensitive/non-sensitive classification make a similar assumption.
3QB trades off increased communication costs for executing queries, while reducing very significantly cryptographic operations. This tradeoff
significantly improves performance, especially, when using cryptographic mechanisms, e.g., fully homomorphic encryption that takes several seconds
to compute a single operation [52], secret-sharing-based techniques that take a few seconds [25], or techniques such as bilinear maps that take over
1.5 hours to perform joins on a dataset of size less than 10MB [59]. When considering such cryptography, increased communication overheads are
fully compensated by the savings. A similar observation, albeit in a very different context was also observed in [57] in the context of MapReduce,
where overshuffling to prevent the adversary to infer sensitive keys in the context of hybrid cloud was shown to be significantly better compared to
private side operations.
Notations Meaning
|S | Number of sensitive data values
|NS | Number of non-sensitive data values
Rs Sensitive parts of a relation R
Rns Non-sensitive parts of a relation R
si and nsj i th sensitive and jth non-sensitive values
SB The number of sensitive bins
SBi i th sensitive bin
|SB| = y Sensitive values in a sensitive bin or the size of a sensitive bin
NSB The number of non-sensitive bins
NSBi i th non-sensitive bin
|NSB| = x Non-sensitive values in a non-sensitive bin or the size of a non-sensitive bin
q(w) A query, q, for a predicate w
q(Wns)(Rns) A query, q, for a set,Wns, of predicates in cleartext over Rns
q(Ws )(Rs ) A query, q, for a set,Ws , of predicates in encrypted form over Rs
q(W )(Rs ,Rns)[A] A query, q, for a set,W , of values, searching on the attribute, A, of the relations Rs and
Rns, whereW =Ws ∪Wns
E(ti ) i th encrypted tuple
Table 1. Notations used in the paper.
2 PARTITIONED COMPUTATION
In this section, we first define more precisely what we mean by partitioned computing, illustrate how such a computation
can leak information due to the joint processing of sensitive and non-sensitive data, discuss the corresponding security
definition, and finally, discuss the system and adversarial models under which we will develop our solutions. Table 1
enlists notations used in this paper.
2.1 The Partitioned Computation Model
We assume the following two entities in our model:
(1) A trusted database (DB) owner who divides a relation R having attributes, say A1,A2, . . . ,An , into the following two
relations based on row-level data sensitivity: Rs and Rns containing all sensitive and non-sensitive tuples, respectively.
The DB owner outsources the relation Rns to a public cloud. The tuples of the relation Rs are encrypted using any
existing non-deterministic encryption [32] mechanism before outsourcing to the same public cloud.
In our setting, the DB owner has to store metadata such as searchable values and their frequency counts, which will
be used for appropriate query formulation using the proposed query binning (QB) algorithm, (on receiving a query
from a user). The size of metadata is smaller than the size of the original data. The DB owner is assumed to have
sufficient storage for such metadata, and also computational capabilities to execute QB algorithm, encryption (of queries
keywords) and decryption (of the results).
Note. The tasks at the DB owner for metadata data storage and QB algorithm execution (which requires to execute
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, will be explained in §4) could, potentially, be executed at the cloud, if the cloud supports
a trusted hardware, e.g., SGX. However, using SGX for QB is nontrivial, since, now, the entire dataset needs to be
encrypted and send to SGX that will decrypt and execute QB. In contrast, the task of rewriting the queries (sent by the
DB owner) based on bin information, i.e., Algorithm 2, is relatively simple and can be done at SGX hosted by the cloud.
In addition, proxy reencryption in our setting is complex, since the results/answers to the query may have additional
outputs, which will need to be filtered out at the trusted side. Thus, solutions based on proxy reencryption will not work
in our settings.
(2) The untrusted public cloud that stores the databases, executes queries, and provides answers to the DB owner.
Query execution. Let us consider a query q over the relation R, denoted by q(R). A partitioned computation strategy
splits the execution of q into two independent subqueries: q(Rs ): a query to be executed on the encrypted sensitive
relation Rs , and q(Rns): a query to be executed on the non-sensitive relation Rns. The final result is computed (using a
query qmerge) by appropriately merging the results of the two subqueries at the DB owner side. In particular, the query q
on a relation R is partitioned, as follows:
q(R) = qmerge
(
q(Rs ),q(Rns)
)
Let us illustrate partitioned computations through an example.
EId FirstName LastName SSN Office# Department
t1 E101 Adam Smith 111 1 Defense
t2 E259 John Williams 222 2 Design
t3 E199 Eve Smith 333 2 Design
t4 E259 John Williams 222 6 Defense
t5 E152 Clark Cook 444 1 Defense
t6 E254 David Watts 555 4 Design
t7 E159 Lisa Ross 666 2 Defense
t8 E152 Clark Cook 444 3 Design
Fig. 1. A relation: Employee.
Example 1. Consider an Employee relation, see Figure 1. Note that the notation ti (1 ≤ i ≤ 8) is not an attribute of
the relation; we used this to indicate the i th tuple. In this relation, the attribute SSN is sensitive, and furthermore, all
tuples of employees for the Department = “Defense” are sensitive. In such a case, the Employee relation may be
stored as the following three relations: (i) Employee1 with attributes EId and SSN (see Figure 2a); (ii) Employee2 with
attributes EId, FirstName, LastName, Office#, and Department, where Department = “Defense” (see Figure 2b); and
(iii) Employee3 with attributes EId, FirstName, LastName, Office#, and Department, where Department <> “Defense”
(see Figure 2c). Since the relations Employee1 and Employee2 (Figures 2a and 2b) contain only sensitive data, these
two relations are encrypted before outsourcing, while Employee3 (Figure 2c), which contains only non-sensitive data, is
outsourced in cleartext. We assume that the sensitive data is strongly encrypted such that the property of ciphertext
indistinguishability (i.e., an adversary cannot distinguish pairs of ciphertexts) is achieved. Thus, the two occurrences of
E152 have two different ciphertexts.
EId SSN
E101 111
E259 222
E199 333
E152 444
E254 555
E159 666
(a) A sensitive relation: Employee1.
EId FirstName LastName Office# Department
t1 E101 Adam Smith 1 Defense
t4 E259 John Williams 6 Defense
t5 E152 Clark Cook 1 Defense
t7 E159 Lisa Ross 2 Defense
(b) A sensitive relation: Employee2.
EId FirstName LastName Office# Department
t2 E259 John Williams 2 Design
t3 E199 Eve Smith 2 Design
t6 E254 David Watts 4 Design
t8 E152 Clark Cook 3 Design
(c) A non-sensitive relation: Employee3.
Fig. 2. Three relations obtained from Employee relation.
Consider a query q: SELECT FirstName, LastName, Office#, Department from Employee
where FirstName = John. In the partitioned computation, the query q is partitioned into two subqueries: qs that
executes on Employee2, and qns that executes on Employee3. qs will retrieve the tuple t4 while qns will retrieve the
tuple t2. qmerдe in this example is simply a union operator. Note that the execution of the query q will also retrieve the
same tuples.
However, such a partitioned computation, if performed naively, leads to inferences about sensitive data from
non-sensitive data. Before discussing the inference attacks, we first present the adversarial model.
2.2 Adversarial Model
We assume an honest-but-curious adversary that is not trustworthy. The honest-but-curious adversary is considered
widely in the standard database-as-a-service query processing model, keyword searches, and join processing [14, 73,
74, 80, 81]. An honest-but-curious adversarial public cloud stores an outsourced dataset without tampering, correctly
computes assigned tasks, and returns answers; however, it may exploit side knowledge (e.g., query execution, background
knowledge, and the output size) to gain as much information as possible about the sensitive data.4 Furthermore, the
honest-but-curious adversary can eavesdrop on the communication channels between the cloud and the DB owner, and
that may help in gaining knowledge about sensitive data, queries, or results; hence, a secure channel is assumed. In our
setting, the adversary has full access to the following:
(1) All the non-sensitive data. For example, for the Employee relation in Example 1, an adversary knows the complete
Employee3 relation (refer to Figure 2c).
(2) Auxiliary/background information of the sensitive data. The auxiliary information may contain metadata, schema of
the relation, and the number of tuples in the relation (note that having an adversary with the auxiliary information is
also considered in literature [42, 55]). In Example 1, the adversary knows that there are two sensitive relations, one of
them containing six tuples and the other one containing four tuples, in the Employee1 and the Employee2 relations;
Figures 2a and 2b. In contrast, the adversary is not aware of the following information before the query execution: how
many people work in a specific sensitive department, is a specific person working only in a sensitive department, only
in a non-sensitive department, or both.
(3) Adversarial view. When executing a query, an adversary knows which encrypted sensitive tuples and cleartext non-
sensitive tuples are sent in response to a query. We refer this as the adversarial view, denoted by AV : AV = Inc ∪ Opc ,
where Inc refers to the query arrives at the cloud and Opc refers to the encrypted and non-encrypted tuples, transmitted
in response to Inc . For example, the first row of Table 2 shows an adversarial view that shows that Opc = t2 tuples from
the non-sensitive relation and encrypted Opc = t4 tuples from the sensitive relation are returned to answer the query for
Inc = E259.
(4) Some frequent query values. The adversary observes query predicates on the non-sensitive data, and hence, can deduce
the most frequent query predicates by observing many queries.
2.3 Inference Attacks in Partitioned Computations
To see the inference attack on the sensitive data while jointly processing sensitive and non-sensitive data, consider the
following three queries on the Employee2 and Employee3 relations; refer to Figures 2b and 2c.
Example 2. (i) retrieve tuples corresponding to employee E259, (ii) retrieve tuples corresponding to employee E101,
and (iii) retrieve tuples corresponding to employee E199.5 When answering a query, the adversary knows the tuple ids
of retrieved encrypted tuples and the full information of the returned non-sensitive tuples. We refer to this information
gain by the adversary as the adversarial view, shown in Table 2, where E(ti) denotes an encrypted tuple ti .
Query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Employee2 Employee3
E259 E(t4) t2
E101 E(t1) null
E199 null t3
Table 2. Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view.
4The honest-but-curious adversary cannot launch any attack against the DB owner. We do not consider cyber-attacks that can exfiltrate data from the
DB owner directly, since defending against generic cyber-attacks is outside the scope of this paper.
5We used random Eids, which is also common in a real employee relation. In contrast, in sequential ids, the absence of an id from the non-sensitive
relation directly informs the adversary that the given id exists in the sensitive relation.
Outputs of the above three queries will reveal enough information to learn something about sensitive data. In the
first query, the adversary learns that E259 works in both sensitive and non-sensitive departments, because the answers
obtained from the two relations contribute to the final answer. Moreover, the adversary may learn which sensitive tuple
has an Eid equals to E259. In the second query, the adversary learns that E101 works only in a sensitive department,
because the query will not return any answer from the Employee3 relation. In the third query, the adversary learns that
E199 works only in a non-sensitive department.
2.4 The Query Binning (QB) Approach: An Overview
In order to prevent the inference attack in the partitioned computation, we need a new security definition. Before we
discuss the formal definition of partitioned data security (§3), we first provide a possible solution to prevent inference
attacks and then intuition for the security definition.
The query binning (QB) strategy stores a non-sensitive relation, say Rns, in cleartext while it stores a sensitive
relation, say Rs , using a cryptographically secure approach. QB prevents leakage such as in Example 2 by appropriately
mapping a query for a predicate, say q(w), to corresponding queries both over the non-sensitive relation, say q(Wns)(Rns),
and encrypted relation, say q(Ws )(Rs ). The queries q(Wns)(Rns) and q(Ws )(Rs ), each represents a set of predicates (or
selection queries) that are executed over the relation Rns in plaintext and, respectively, over the sensitive relation Rs ,
using the underlying cryptographic method. The set of predicates in q(Wns)(Rns) (likewise in q(WS )(Rs )) correspond
to the non-sensitive (sensitive) bins including the predicate w , denoted by NSB (SB). The predicates in q(Ws )(Rs ) are
encrypted before transmitting to the cloud.
The bins are selected such that: (i) w ∈ q(Wns)(Rns) ∩ q(Ws )(Rs ) to ensure that all the tuples containing the predicate
w are retrieved, and, (ii) joint execution of the queries q(Wns)(Rns) and q(Ws )(Rs ) (hereafter, denoted by q(W )(Rs ,Rns),
whereW =Ws ∪Wns) does not leak the predicatew . Results from the execution of the queries q(Wns)(Rns) and q(Ws )(Rs )
are decrypted, possibly filtered, and merged to generate the final answer. Note that bins are created only once for all the
values of a searching attribute before any query is executed. The details of the bin formation will be discussed in §4.
For answering the above-mentioned three queries, QB creates two bins on sensitive parts: {E101, E259}, {E152,
E159}, and two sets on non-sensitive parts: {E259, E254}, {E199, E152}. Table 3 illustrates the generated adversar-
ial view when QB is used to answer queries as shown in Example 2. In this example, row 1 of Table 3 shows that this
instance of QB maps the query for E259 to ⟨E259, E254⟩ over cleartext and to encrypted version of values for ⟨E259,
E101⟩ over sensitive data. Note that simply from the generated adversarial views, the adversary cannot determine the
query value w (E259 in the example) or find a value that is shared between the two sets. Thus, while answering a query,
the adversary cannot learn which employee works only in defense, design, or in both.
The reason is that the desired query value, w , is encrypted with other encrypted values of Ws , and, furthermore,
the query value, w , cannot be distinguished from many requested non-sensitive values ofWns, which are in cleartext.
Consequently, the adversary is unable to find an intersection of the two sets, which is the exact value.6
Query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Employee2 Employee3
E259 E(t4), E(t1) t2, t6
E101 E(t4), E(t1) t3, t8
E199 E(t4), E(t1) t3, t8
Table 3. Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view, following QB.
Thus, in a joint processing of sensitive and non-sensitive data, the goal of the adversary is to find as much sensitive
information as possible (using the adversarial view or background knowledge), and the goal of a secure technique is to
prevent information leakage through the joint processing of non-sensitive and sensitive data.
3 PARTITIONED DATA SECURITY
In this section, we formalize the notion of partitioned data security that establishes when a partitioned computation
over sensitive and non-sensitive data does not leak any sensitive information. Note that an adversary may seek to infer
6For hiding an exact selection predicate over an encrypted relation regardless of data sensitivity, an approach to create a set of selection predicates
including the exact predicate is presented in [50], which, however, cannot be used to search over sensitive and non-sensitive relations or multiple
relations, due to not dealing with inference attacks.
sensitive information using the adversarial view created during query processing, knowledge of output size, frequency
counts, and workload characteristics. We begin by first formalizing the concepts of: associated values, associated tuples,
and relationship between counts of sensitive values.7
Notations used in the definitions. Let t1, t2, . . . , tm be tuples of a sensitive relation, say Rs . Thus, the relation Rs stores
the encrypted tuples E(t1),E(t2), . . . ,E(tm). Let s1, s2, . . . , sm′ be values of an attribute, say A, that appears in one of the
sensitive tuples of Rs . Note thatm′ ≤ m, since several tuples may have an identical value. Furthermore, si ∈ Domain(A),
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m′, where Domain(A) represents the domain of values the attribute A can take. By #s (si ), we refer to
the number of sensitive tuples that have si as the value for attribute A. We further define #s (v) = 0,∀v ∈ Domain(A),
v < s1, s2, . . . , sm′ . Let t1, t2, . . . , tn be tuples of a non-sensitive relation, say Rns. Let ns1, ns2, . . . , nsn′ be values of the
attribute A that appears in one of the non-sensitive tuples of Rns. In analogy with the case where the relation is sensitive,
n′ ≤ n, and nsi ∈ Domain(A), i = 1, 2, . . . ,n′.
Associated values. Let ei = E(ti )[A] be the encrypted representation of an attribute value of A in a sensitive tuple of the
relation Rs , and nsj be a value of the attribute A for some tuple of the relation Rns. We say that ei is associated with nsj ,
(denoted by a=), if the plaintext value of ei is identical to the value nsj . In Example 1, the value of the attribute Eid in
tuple t4 (of Employee2, see Figure 2b) is associated with the value of the attribute Eid in tuple t2 (of Employee3, see
Figure 2c), since both values correspond to E259.
Associated tuples. Let ti be a sensitive tuple of the relation Rs (i.e., Rs stores encrypted representation of ti ) and tj be
a non-sensitive tuple of the relation Rns. We state that ti is associated with tj (for an attribute, say A) iff the value of
the attribute A in ti is associated with the value of the attribute A in tj (i.e., ti [A] a= tj [A]). Note that this is the same as
stating that the two values of attribute A are equal for both tuples.
Relationship between counts of sensitive values. Let vi and vj be two distinct values in Domain(A). We denote the
relationship between the counts of sensitive tuples with these A values (i.e., #s (vi ) (or #s (vj ))) by vi r∼ vj . Note that
r∼ can be one of <,=, or > relationships. For instance, in Example 1, the E101 r∼ E259 corresponds to =, since both
values have exactly one sensitive tuple (see Figure 2b), while E101 r∼ E199 is >, since there is one sensitive tuple with
value E101 while there is no sensitive tuple with E199.
Given the above definitions, we can now formally state the security requirement that ensures that simultaneous
execution of queries over sensitive (encrypted) and non-sensitive (plaintext) data does not leak any information. Before
that, we wish to mention the need of a new security definition in our context. The inference attack in the partitioned
computing can be considered to be related to the known-plaintext attack (KPA) wherein the adversary knows some
plaintext data which is hidden in a set of ciphertext. In KPA, the adversary’s goal is to determine which ciphertext data
is related to a given plaintext, i.e., determining a mapping between ciphertext and the corresponding plaintext data
representing the same value. In our setup, non-sensitive values are visible to the adversary in plaintext. However, the
attacks are different since, unlike the case of KPA, in our setup, the ciphertext data might not contain any data value that
is the same as some non-sensitive data visible to the adversary in plaintext.8
Definition: Partitioned Data Security. Let R be a relation containing sensitive and non-sensitive tuples. Let Rs and
Rns be the sensitive and non-sensitive relations, respectively. Let AV be an adversarial view generated for a query
q(w)(Rs ,Rns)[A], where the query, q, for a value w in the attribute A of the Rs and Rns relations. Let X be the auxiliary
information about the sensitive data, and PrAdv be the probability of the adversary knowing any information. A query
execution mechanism ensures the partitioned data security if the following two properties hold:
(1) PrAdv[ei a= nsj |X ] = PrAdv[ei a= nsj |X ,AV ], where ei = E(ti )[A] is the encrypted representation for the attribute value A
for any tuple ti of the relation Rs and nsj is a value for the attribute A for any tuple of the relation Rns.
(2) PrAdv[vi r∼ vj |X ] = PrAdv[vi r∼ vj |X ,AV ], for all vi ,vi ∈ Domain(A).
7To develop the notation, defining security, and developing QB (§4), we assume that search is performed on a specific attribute, A, over a relation, R.
The approach trivially generalizes when several attributes are searchable – we need to maintain metadata required for QB not just for A, but for all
searchable attributes in R.
8The HBC adversary cannot launch the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) and the chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). Since the sensitive data is non-
deterministically encrypted (by our assumption), it is not prone to the ciphertext only attack (COA).
The first equation (1) captures the fact that an initial probability of associating a sensitive tuple with a non-sensitive
tuple will be identical after executing a query on the relations. Thus, an adversary cannot learn anything from an
adversarial view generated after the query execution. Satisfying this condition also prevents us in achieving success
against KPA. The second equation (2) states that the probability of an adversary gaining information about the relative
frequency of sensitive values does not increase after the query execution. In Example 2, an execution of any three
queries (for values E101, E199, or E259) without using QB does not satisfy the above first equation. For example,
the query for E199 retrieves the only tuple from non-sensitive relation, and that changes the probability of estimating
whether E199 is sensitive or non-sensitive to 0 as compared to an initial probability of the same estimation, which was
1/4. Hence, execution of the three queries violates partitioned data security. However, the query execution for E259 and
E101 satisfies the second equation, since the count of returned tuples from Employee2 is equal. Hence, the adversary
cannot distinguish between the count of the values (E259 and E101) in the domain of Eid of Employee2 relation.
4 QUERY BINNING TECHNIQUE
We develop our strategy initially under the assumption that queries are only on a single attribute, say A. QB approach
takes as inputs: (i) the set of data values (of the attribute A) that are sensitive, along with their counts, and (ii) the set
of data values (of the attribute A) that are non-sensitive, along with their counts. QB returns a partition of attribute
values that form the query bins for both the sensitive as well as for the non-sensitive parts of the query. We begin in
§4.1 by developing the approach for the case when a sensitive tuple is associated with at most one non-sensitive tuple
(Algorithm 1).
Informally, QB distributes attribute values in a matrix, where rows are sensitive bins, and columns are non-sensitive
bins. For example, suppose there are 16 values, say 0, 1, . . . , 15, and assume all the values have sensitive and associated
non-sensitive tuples. Now, the DB owner arranges 16 values in a 4 × 4 matrix, as follows:
NSB0 NSB1 NSB2 NSB3
SB0 11 2 5 14
SB1 10 3 8 7
SB2 0 15 6 4
SB3 13 1 12 9
In this example, we have four sensitive bins: SB0 {11,2,5,14}, SB1 {10,3,8,7}, SB2 {0,15,6,4}, SB3 {13,1,12,9}, and
four non-sensitive bins: NSB0 {11,10,0,13}, NSB1 {2,3,15,1}, NSB2 {5,8,6,12}, NSB3 {14,7,4,9}. When a query arrives
for a value, say 1, the DB owner searches for the tuples containing values 2,3,15,1 (viz. NSB1) on the non-sensitive data
and values in SB3 (viz., 13,1,12,9) on the sensitive data using the cryptographic mechanism integrated into QB. We will
show that in the proposed approach, while the adversary learns that the query corresponds to one of the four values
in NSB1, since query values in SB3 are encrypted, the adversary does not learn the actual sensitive value or the actual
non-sensitive value that is identical to a cleartext sensitive value.
4.1 The Base Case
QB consists of two steps. First, query bins are created (information about which will reside at the DB owner) using
which queries will be rewritten. The second step consists of rewriting the query based on the binning.
Here, QB is explained for the base case, where a sensitive tuple, say ts , is associated with at most a single non-
sensitive tuple, say tns, and vice versa (i.e.,
a
= is a 1:1 relationship). Thus, if the value has two tuples, then one of them
must be sensitive and the other one must be non-sensitive, but both the tuples cannot be sensitive or non-sensitive. A
value can also have only one tuple, either sensitive or non-sensitive. Note that if t1, t2, . . . , tl are sensitive tuples, with
values of an attribute A being s1, s2, . . . sn , si , sj if i , j.
Thus, in the remainder of the section, we will refer to association between encrypted value E(ti )[A] and a non-
sensitive value nsj simply as an association between values si and nsj , where si is the cleartext representation of E(ti )[A]
and nsj is a value in the attribute A of a non-sensitive relation. That is, si
a
= nsj represents E(ti )[A] a= nsj .
The scenario depicted in Example 1 satisfies the base case. The EId attribute values corresponding to sensitive tuples
include ⟨E101, E259,E152,E159⟩ and corresponding to non-sensitive tuples are ⟨E199, E259, E254, E152⟩ for
which a= is 1:1. We discuss QB under the above assumption, but these assumptions are relaxed in the conference version
of this paper (please see §IV.A and §IV.B in [53]). Before describing QB, we first define the concept of approximately
square factors of a number.
Algorithm 1: Bin-creation algorithm, the base case.
Inputs: |NS |: the number of values in the non-sensitive data, |S |: the number of values in the sensitive data.
Outputs: SB: sensitive bins; NSB: non-sensitive bins
Variable: |NSB|: non-sensitive values in a non-sensitive bin, |SB|: sensitive values in a sensitive bin.
1 Function create_bins(S,NS) begin
2 Permute all sensitive values
3 x ,y ← approx_sq_factors(|NS |): x ≥ y
4 |NSB| ← x , NSB ← ⌈|NS |/x⌉, SB ← x , |SB| ← y
5 for i ∈ (1, |S |) do SB[i modulo x][∗] ← S[i]
6 for (i, j) ∈ (0, SB − 1), (0, |SB| − 1) do NSB[j][i] ← allocateNS(SB[i][j])
7 for i ∈ (0,NSB − 1) do NSB[i, ∗] ← fill the bin if empty with the size limit to x
8 return SB and NSB
9 Function allocateNS(SB[i][j]) begin
find a non-sensitive value associated with the jth sensitive value of the i th sensitive bin
Approximately square factors. We say two numbers, say x and y, are approximately square factors of a number, say
n > 0, if x × y = n, and x and y are equal or close to each other such that the difference between x and y is less than
the difference between any two factors, say x ′ and y ′, of n such that x ′ × y ′ = n.
Step 1: Bin-creation. QB, described in Algorithm 1, finds two approximately square factors of |NS |, say x and y, where
x ≥ y. QB creates SB = x sensitive bins, where each sensitive bin contains at most y values. Thus, we assume |S | ≥ x .
QB, further, creates NSB = ⌈|NS |/x⌉ non-sensitive bins, where each non-sensitive bin contains at most |NSB| = x
values. Note that we are assuming that |S | ≤ |NS |.9
Assignment of sensitive values. We number the sensitive bins from 0 to x − 1 and the values therein from 0 to y − 1. To
assign a value to sensitive bins, QB first permutes the set of sensitive values. Such a permutation is kept secret from the
adversary by the DB owner.10 In order to assign sensitive values to sensitive bins, QB takes the i th sensitive value and
assigns it to the (i modulo x)th sensitive bin (see Lines 2 and 5 of Algorithm 1).
Assignment of non-sensitive values. We number the non-sensitive bins from 0 to ⌈|NS |⌉/x − 1 and values therein from
0 to x − 1. In order to assign non-sensitive values, QB takes a sensitive bin, say j, and its i th sensitive value. Assign
the non-sensitive value associated with the i th sensitive value to the jth position of the i th non-sensitive bin. Here,
if each value of a sensitive bin has an associated non-sensitive value and |S | = |NS |, then QB has assigned all the
non-sensitive values to their bins (Line 6 of Algorithm 1). Note that it may be the case that only a few sensitive values
have their associated non-sensitive values and |S | ≤ |NS |. In this case, we assign the sensitive and their associated
non-sensitive values to bins like we did in the previous case. However, we need to assign the non-sensitive values that
are not associated with a sensitive value, by filling all the non-sensitive bins to size x (Line 7 of Algorithm 1).
Aside. Note that QB assigned at least as many values in a non-sensitive bin as it assigned to a sensitive bin. QB may
form the non-sensitive and sensitive bins in such a way that the number of values in sensitive bins is higher than the
non-sensitive bins. We chose sensitive bins to be smaller since the processing time on encrypted data is expected to
be higher than cleartext data processing; hence, by searching and retrieving fewer sensitive tuples, we decrease the
encrypted data-processing time.
Step 2: Bin-retrieval – answering queries. Algorithm 2 presents the pseudocode for the bin-retrieval algorithm. The
algorithm, first, checks the existence of a query value in sensitive bins and/or non-sensitive bins (see Lines 2 and 5 of
Algorithm 2). If the value exists in a sensitive bin and a non-sensitive bin, the DB owner retrieves the corresponding
two bins (see Line 9). Note that here the adversarial view is not enough to leak the query value or to find a value that
is shared between the two bins. The reason is that the desired query value is encrypted with a set of other encrypted
9QB can also handle the case of |S | > |NS | by applying Algorithm 1 in a reverse way, i.e., factorizing |S |.
10We emphasize to first permute sensitive values to prevent the adversary to create bins at her end; e.g., if the adversary is aware of a fact that
employee ids are ordered, then she can also create bins by knowing the number of resultant tuples to a query. However, for simplicity, we do not show
permuted sensitive values in any figure.
Algorithm 2: Bin-retrieval algorithm.
Inputs: w: the query value. SB and NSB: Sensitive and non-sensitive bins, created by Algorithm 1.
Outputs: SBa and NSBb : one sensitive bin and one non-sensitive bin to be retrieved for answering w .
Variables: found ← false
1 Function retrieve_bins(q(w)) begin
2 for (i, j) ∈ (0, SB − 1), (0, |SB| − 1) do
3 if w = SBi [j] then
4 return SBi and NSBj ; found ← true; break
5 if found , true then
6 for (i, j) ∈ (0,NSB − 1), (0, |NSB| − 1) do
7 if w = NSBi [j] then
8 return NSBi and SBj ; break
9 Retrieve the desired tuples from the cloud by sending encrypted values of the bin SBi (or SBj ) and cleartext
values of the bin NSBj (or NSBi ) to the cloud
values and, furthermore, the query value is obscured in many requested non-sensitive values, which are in cleartext.
Consequently, the adversary is unable to find an intersection of the two bins, which is the exact value.
There are the following three other cases to consider:
(1) Some sensitive values of a bin are not associated with any non-sensitive value. For example, in Figure 3, the sensitive
values s4, s7, s8, s9, and s10 are not associated with any non-sensitive value.
(2) A sensitive bin does not hold any value that is associated with any non-sensitive value. For example, the sensitive bin
SB4 in Figure 3 satisfies this clause.
(3) A non-sensitive bin containing no value that is associated with any sensitive value.
In all the three cases, if the DB owner retrieves only either a sensitive or non-sensitive bin containing the value, then
it will lead to information leakage similar to Example 2. In order to prevent such leakage, Algorithm 2 follows two
rules stated below (see Lines 4 and 8 of Algorithm 2):
Tuple retrieval rule R1. If the query value w is a sensitive value that is at the jth position of the i th sensitive bin (i.e.,
w = SBi [j]), then the DB owner will fetch the i th sensitive and the jth non-sensitive bins (see Line 4 of Algorithm 2). By
Line 2 of Algorithm 2, the DB owner knows that the value w is either sensitive or non-sensitive.
Tuple retrieval rule R2. If the query value w is a non-sensitive value that is at the jth position of the i th non-sensitive
bin, then the DB owner will fetch the i th non-sensitive and the jth sensitive bins (see Line 8 of Algorithm 2).
Note that if query value w is in both sensitive and non-sensitive bins, then both the rules are applicable, and they
retrieve exactly the same bins. In addition, if the value w is neither in a sensitive or a non-sensitive bin, then there is no
need to retrieve any bin.
Aside. After knowing the bins, the DB owner sends all the sensitive values in the encrypted form and the non-sensitive
values in cleartext to the cloud. The tuple retrieval based on the encrypted values reveals only the tuple addresses that
satisfy the requested values. We can also hide the access-patterns by using PIR, ORAM, or DSSE on each required
sensitive value. As mentioned in §1, access-pattern-hiding techniques are prone to size and workload-skew attacks.
Nonetheless, the use of QB with access-pattern-hiding techniques makes them secure against these attacks.11
Associated bins. We say a sensitive bin is associated with a non-sensitive bin, if the two bins are retrieved for answering
at least one query.
Our aim when answering queries for all the sensitive and non-sensitive values using Algorithm 2 is to associate
each sensitive bin with each non-sensitive bin; resulting in the adversary being unable to predict which (if any) is the
value shared between two bins.
Example 3: QB example Step 1: Bin Creation. We show the bin-creation algorithm for 10 sensitive values and 10
non-sensitive values. We assume that only five sensitive values, say s1, s2, s3, s5, s6, have their associated non-sensitive
11QB is designed as a general mechanism that provides partitioned data security when coupled with any cryptographic technique. For special
cryptographic techniques that hide access-patterns, it may be possible to design a different mechanism that may provide partitioned data security.
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Fig. 3. QB for 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
values, say ns1, ns2, ns3, ns5, ns6, and the remaining 5 sensitive (say, s4, s7, s8, . . . s10) and 5 non-sensitive values (say,
ns11, ns12, . . . , ns15) are not associated. For simplicity, we use different indexes for non-associated values.
QB creates 2 non-sensitive bins and 5 sensitive bins, and divides 10 sensitive values over the following 5 sensitive
bins: SB0 {s5, s10}, SB1 {s1, s6}, SB2 {s2, s7}, SB3 {s3, s8}, SB4 {s4, s9}; see Figure 3. Now, QB distributes non-sensitive
values associated with the sensitive values over two non-sensitive bins, resulting in the bin NSB0 {ns5, ns1, ns2, ns3, ∗}
and NSB1 {∗, ns6, ∗, ∗, ∗}, where a ∗ shows an empty position in the bin. In the sequel, QB needs to fill the non-sensitive
bins with the remaining 5 non-sensitive values; hence, ns11 is assigned to the last position of the bin NSB0, and the bin
NSB1 contains the remaining 4 non-sensitive values such as {ns12, ns6, ns13, ns14, ns15}.
Example 3: QB example (continued) Step 2: Bin-retrieval. Now, we show how to retrieve tuples. If a query is for
a sensitive value, say s2 (refer to Figure 3), then the DB owner fetches two bins SB2 and NSB0. If a query is for a
non-sensitive value, say ns14, then the DB owner fetches two bins NSB1 and SB3. Thus, it is impossible for the adversary
to find (by observing the adversarial view) which is an exact query value from the non-sensitive bin and which is the
sensitive value associated with one of the non-sensitive values. This fact is also clear from Table 4, which shows that
the adversarial view is not enough to leak information from the joint processing of sensitive and non-sensitive data,
unlike Example 2. In Table 4, E(si ) shows the encrypted value of si , and we are showing the adversarial view only for
queries for s2, s7, and ns13. One may easily create the adversarial view for other queries. In this example, note that the
bin SB2 gets associated with both the non-sensitive bins NSB0 and NSB1, due to following Algorithm 2.
Exact query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Sensitive bin and data Non-sensitive bin and data
s2 or ns2 SB2:E(s2),E(s7 ) NSB0:ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns11
s7 SB2:E(s2),E(s7 ) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns13 SB2:E(s2),E(s7 ) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
Table 4. Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view after retrieving tuples according to Algorithm 2.
4.2 Algorithm Correctness
We will prove that QB does not lead to information leakage through the joint processing of sensitive and non-sensitive
data. To prove correctness, we first define the concept of surviving matches. Informally, we show that QB maintains
surviving matches among all sensitive and non-sensitive values, resulting in all sensitive bins being associated with
all non-sensitive bins. Thus, an initial condition: a sensitive value is assumed to have an identical value to one of the
non-sensitive value is preserved.
Surviving matches. We define surviving matches, which are classified as either surviving matches of values or surviving
matches of bins, as follows:
Before query execution. Observe that before retrieving any tuple, under the assumption that no one except the DB owner
can decrypt an encrypted sensitive value, say E(si ), the adversary cannot learn which non-sensitive value is associated
with the value si . Thus, the adversary will consider that the value E(si ) is associated with one of the non-sensitive values.
Based on this fact, the adversary can create a complete bipartite graph having |S | nodes on one side and |NS | nodes on
the other side. The edges in the graph are called surviving matches of the values. For example, before executing any
query, the adversary can create a bipartite graph for 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
Sensitive
bins
Non-sensitive 
bins
SB0
SB1
SB2
SB3
SB4
NSB0
NSB1
(a) Surviving matches after the tuple retrieval following
Algorithm 2.
Sensitive
bins
Non-sensitive 
bins
SB0
SB1
SB2
SB3
SB4
NSB0
NSB1
(b) Surviving matches without following Algorithm 2 for
ns12, ns13, ns14, ns15; also see Table 4.
Fig. 4. An example to show security of QB using surviving matches for 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
Exact query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Sensitive bin and data Non-sensitive bin and data
s2 or ns2 SB2:E(s2),E(s7 ) NSB0:ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns11
s6 or ns6 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
s7 SB2:E(s2),E(s7) NSB0:ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns11
ns12 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns13 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns14 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns15 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
Table 5. Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view without following Algorithm 2.
After query execution. Recall that the query execution on the datasets creates an adversarial view that guides the
adversary to create a (new) bipartite graph containing SB nodes on one side and NSB nodes on the other side. The
edges in the new graph (obtained after the query execution) are called surviving matches of the bins. For example, after
executing queries according to Algorithm 2, the adversary can create a bipartite graph having 5 nodes on one side and 2
nodes on the other side, see Figure 4a. Note that since bins contain values, the surviving matches of the bins can lead
to the surviving matches of the values. Hence, from Figure 4a, the adversary can also create a bipartite graph for 10
sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
We show that a technique for retrieving tuples that drops some surviving matches of the bins leading to drop of the
surviving matches of the values is not secure, and hence, results in the information leakage through non-sensitive data.
Example 4: Dropping surviving matches. In Figure 3, for answering queries for associated values s1, s2, s3, s5, s6,
ns1, ns2, ns3, ns5, or ns6, the DB owner must follow Line 4 or 8 of Algorithm 2 for retrieving the two bins holding
corresponding sensitive and non-sensitive data; otherwise, the DB owner cannot retrieve two bins that share a common
value. Now, retrieved tuples for these values create an adversarial view as shown in the first six lines except the fourth
line of Table 4. However, for answering values s4, s7, s8, s9, s10, ns6, ns12, ns13, ns14, or ns15 (recall that these values are
not associated), if the DB owner does not follow Algorithm 2 and retrieves the bin containing the desired value with any
randomly selected bin of the other side, then it could result in the following adversarial view; see Table 5. We show the
case when NSB1 is only associated with bin SB1, and bins SB2 is only associated with bin NSB0, since Algorithm 2 is not
followed.
Having such an adversarial view (Table 5), the adversary can learn two facts that
(1) Encrypted sensitive tuples of the bin SB2 have associated non-sensitive tuples only in the bin NSB0, not in NSB1
(Figure 4b).
(2) Non-sensitive tuples of the bin NSB1 have their associated sensitive tuples only in the bin SB1 (see Figure 4b).
Based on this adversarial view (Table 5), the bipartite graph drops some surviving matches of the bins (see Figure 4b).
(That fact leads to the dropping of the surviving matches of the values, specifically, surviving matches between sensitive
values s3, s4, s5, s8, s9, s10 and non-sensitive value ns6, ns12, ns13, ns14, ns15.) Hence, a random retrieval of bins is not a
secure technique to prevent information leakage through non-sensitive data accessing.
In contrast, if the DB owner uses Line 4 or 8 of Algorithm 2 for retrieving values that are not associated, the
above-mentioned facts (i) and (ii) no longer hold. Figure 4a shows the case when each sensitive bin is associated with
each non-sensitive bin, if Algorithm 2 is followed. Thus, we can see that all the surviving matches of the bins and
values are preserved after answering queries. Therefore, for the example of 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values, QB
(Algorithms 1 and 2) is secure, and under the given assumptions (§3), the adversary cannot find an exact association
between a sensitive and a non-sensitive value.
Security Proof
Now, we prove that QB is secure and satisfies the definition of partitioned data security (Theorem 4.2) by first proving
that all the sensitive bins are associated with all the non-sensitive bins (Theorem 4.1), which is intuitively clear by
Example 4. Recall that the only way a surviving match could be removed is if there is no sensitive value in a sensitive
bin, say SBj that does not have an associated non-sensitive value. In this case for answering a value belonging to SBj ,
we retrieve either only the bin SBj or the bin SBj with any randomly selected non-sensitive bin. Note that the adversary
cannot learn anything from the encrypted data, since the keys are only known to the DB owner.
THEOREM 4.1. Let |S | and |NS | be the number of sensitive and non-sensitive values, respectively. By following
Algorithm 1, |S | and |NS | values are distributed over SB sensitive and NSB non-sensitive bins, respectively. Answering a
set of queries using QB (Algorithm 2) will not remove any surviving matches of the bins and that leads to preserve all
the surviving matches of the values.
PROOF. We show that QB will not remove any surviving matches of the bins by showing that a sensitive bin, say
SBj , must be associated with all the non-sensitive bins. A similar argument can be proved for any non-sensitive bin. Let
y be the number of sensitive values in the bin SBj , and let p ≥ y, (p = NSB) be the number non-sensitive bins. We will
prove the following three arguments:
(1) If a sensitive value, say si ∈ SBj , is associated with a non-sensitive value (i.e., ∃nsz ∈ Rns : nsz a= si ), then two bins,
SBj , and one non-sensitive bin, holding the value nsz , are retrieved.
(2) If a sensitive value, say si ∈ SBj , is not associated with any non-sensitive value (i.e., ∀nsj ∈ Rns : si a, nsj ), then the
bin SBj and one of the non-sensitive bins are retrieved. Following that, if all the sensitive values of the bins SBj are
not associated with any non-sensitive value (i.e., ∀nsj ∈ Rns,∀si ∈ SBj : si a, nsj ), then the bin SBj and y different
non-sensitive bins are retrieved.
By proving the first and second arguments, we will show that if there are only y non-sensitive bins, then a sensitive
bin must be associated with all the y non-sensitive bins. The following third argument will consider more than y
non-sensitive bins.
(3) If there are more than y non-sensitive bins (say, NSBy ,NSBy+1, . . . ,NSBp ) having x values that are not associated with
any sensitive value (i.e., ∀nsj ∈ NSBy ∨NSBy+1∨ . . .∨NSBp , nsj a, si , i = 1, 2, . . . , |S |), then each of these non-sensitive
bins must be associated with the bin SBj .
By satisfying the above three arguments, we prove that, thus, the bin SBj is associated with all non-sensitive bins, and
hence, all surviving matches of the bins and, eventually, values are preserved.
First case. The value si is allocated to (i modulo x)th sensitive bin at an index, say z, where z = 0, 1, . . .y − 1, and its
associated non-sensitive value is allocated to the (i modulo x)th position of the zth non-sensitive bin. When answering
a query for si according to the rule R1, the bin SBj with the bin NSBz are retrieved. Consequently, the desired tuples
containing si and its associated non-sensitive value are retrieved, and that are correct answers to the query.
Second case. When answering a query for the value si = SBj [u] (u ∈ 0, 1,y − 1) that does not have any associated
non-sensitive value, by following the rule R1, the bin SBj with one of the non-sensitive bin NSBu are retrieved. Moreover,
answering queries for all the y values (0, 1, y − 1) of the bin SBj , by following rule R1, requires us to retrieve the SBj
with all the y − 1 (0, 1, y − 1) non-sensitive bins.
Third case. Since the non-sensitive bin, say NSBz , where z = y,y + 1, . . . ,p, must hold a value at the jth position, by
following the rule R2, the bin NSBz and the sensitive bin SBj are fetched for answering a query for nsj .
Therefore, the bin SBj is associated with all the non-sensitive bins, and hence, all the surviving matches between the
values of the bin SBj and all the non-sensitive bins are also maintained. □
Since we proved all sensitive bins are associated with all the non-sensitive bins, based on this fact, we will show that
the first condition of partitioned data security holds to be true for any query. Here, we do not show the second equation
of partitioned data security definition (i.e., Pradv[si r∼ sj |X ] = Pradv[si r∼ sj |X ,q(w)(Rs ,Rns)[A]]); recall that here in the
base case, we assumed that a value has only a single sensitive tuple; hence, the condition holds true.
THEOREM 4.2. (Preserve partitioned data security) Let R be a relation containing sensitive and non-sensitive
tuples. Let Rs and Rns be the sensitive and non-sensitive relations, respectively. Let q(w)(Rs ,Rns)[A] be a query, q, for a
value w in the attribute A of the Rs and Rns relations. Let X be the auxiliary information about the sensitive data, and
PrAdv be the probability of the adversary knowing any information. Let ei be the i th sensitive tuple value in the attribute
A of the relation Rs and nsj is the jth non-sensitive value in the attribute A of the relation Rns. The execution of a set of
queries on the attribute A on the relations using QB leads to the following equation to be true:
Pradv[ei a= nsj |X ] = Pradv[ei a= nsj |X ,AV ]
where i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , |S | and j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , |NS |.
Proof sketch. We provide an example of four values to show the correctness of the above theorem. Let v1, v2, v3, and v4
be values containing only one sensitive and one non-sensitive tuple. Let E1, E2, E3, and E4 be encrypted representations
of these values in an arbitrary order, i.e., it is not mandatory that E1 is the encrypted representation ofv1. In this example,
the cloud stores an encrypted relation, say Rs , containing four encrypted tuples with encrypted representations E1, E2,
E3, E4 and a cleartext relation, say Rns, containing four cleartext tuples with values v1, v2, v3, v4. The objective of the
adversary is to deduce a cleartext value corresponding to an encrypted value. Note that before executing a query, the
probability of an encrypted value, say Ei , to have the cleartext value, say vi , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 is 1/4, which QB maintains at the
end of a query.
Assume that the user wishes to retrieve the tuple containing v1. By following QB, the user asks a query, say
q(E1,E3)(Rs ), on the encrypted relation Rs for E1, E3, and a query, say q(v1,v2)(Rns), on the cleartext relation Rns for
v1,v2. After executing the queries, the adversary holds an adversarial view given in Table 6.
Exact query value (hidden from adversary) Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Sensitive data Non-sensitive data
v1 E1,E3 v1,v2
Table 6. Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view after executing a query for v1, by following Algorithm 2.
In this example, we show that the probability of finding the cleartext value of an encrypted representation, say Ei ,
1 ≤ i ≤ 4, remains identical before and after a query. In order to show that when a query comes for 2 × √n values
by following QB, where n is the number of values in the non-sensitive relation,
√
n values are asked for the sensitive
relation and
√
n values are asked for the non-sensitive relation, we need to figure out:
(1) All possible allocations of the non-sensitive
√
n values, say v1,v2, . . . ,v√n , to
√
n encrypted sensitive values, say
E1,E2, . . . ,E√n . Here, we use the term allocation to show the fact that the encrypted representation of Ei has the
cleartext value vi .
In our example of four values, we find allocations of four non-sensitive values v1, v2, v3, v4 to encrypted representation
E1, E2, E3, E4.
(2) All possible allocations of
√
n non-sensitive values, except one non-sensitive value, say vi , that is allocated to an
encrypted sensitive value, say Ei , to the remaining encrypted sensitive values.
In the case of four values and above-mentioned queries, we find allocations of the non-sensitive values v2, v3, v4 to the
encrypted sensitive values E2, E3, E4 while assuming that the encrypted representation of v1 is E1.
The ratio of the above two provides the probability of finding a cleartext value corresponding to its encrypted value
after the query execution.
When the query arrives for ⟨E1,E3,v1,v2⟩, the adversary gets the fact that the cleartext representation of E1 and
E3 cannot be v1 and v2 or v3 and v4. If this will happen, then there is no way to associate a sensitive bin with each
non-sensitive bin. Now, if the adversary considers the cleartext representation of E1 is v1, then the adversary has the
following four possible allocations of the values v1, v2, v3, v4 to E1, E2, E3, E4:
⟨v1,v2,v3,v4⟩, ⟨v1,v2,v4,v3⟩,
⟨v1,v3,v4,v2⟩, ⟨v1,v4,v3,v2⟩.
However, the allocations ⟨v1,v3,v2,v4⟩ and ⟨v1,v4,v2,v3⟩ to E1, E2, E3, and E4 cannot exist. Since the adversary is
not aware of the exact cleartext value of E1, the adversary also considers the cleartext representation of E1 is v2. This
results in four more possible allocations of the values to E1, E2, E3, and E4, as follows:
⟨v2,v1,v3,v4⟩, ⟨v2,v1,v4,v3⟩,
⟨v2,v3,v4,v1⟩, ⟨v2,v4,v3,v1⟩.
However, ⟨v2,v3,v1,v4⟩ and ⟨v2,v4,v1,v3⟩ cannot exist. Similarly, assuming the cleartext representation of E1 is v3
or v4, we get the following 8 more possible allocations of the values to E1, E2, E3, and E4:
⟨v3,v1,v2,v4⟩, ⟨v3,v2,v1,v4⟩,
⟨v3,v4,v1,v2⟩, ⟨v3,v4,v2,v1⟩,
⟨v4,v1,v2,v3⟩, ⟨v4,v2,v1,v3⟩,
⟨v4,v3,v1,v2⟩, ⟨v4,v3,v2,v1⟩.
Here, the following four allocations of the values to encrypted representation cannot exist:
⟨v3,v1,v4,v2⟩, ⟨v3,v2,v4,v1⟩,
⟨v4,v1,v3,v2⟩, ⟨v4,v2,v3,v1⟩.
Thus, the retrieval of the four tuples containing one of the following: ⟨E1,E3,v1,v2⟩, results in 16 possible allocations
of the values v1, v2, v3, and v4 to E1, E2, E3, and E4, of which only four possible allocations have v1 as the cleartext
representation of E1. This results in the probability of finding E1 = v1 is 1/4. A similar argument also holds for other
encrypted values. Hence, an initial probability of associating a sensitive value with a non-sensitive value remains
identical after executing a query.
Thus, we can conclude the following:
(1) All possible allocations of
√
n non-sensitive values, except one non-sensitive value, say v1, that we allocate to an
encrypted sensitive value, say E1, to the remaining encrypted sensitive values is (n − 1)! − x , where n is the number of
values in the non-sensitive relation and x is the number of allocations of values v2,v3, . . . ,v√n to E2,E3, . . . ,E√n that
cannot exist.
(2) All possible allocations of the non-sensitive
√
n values, say v1,v2, . . . ,v√n , to
√
n encrypted sensitive values, say
E1,E2, . . . ,E√n , is n × ((n − 1)! − x). This is true because we cannot allocate any combination of the values asked in the
query to any encrypted representations that are asked by the query.
Thus, the retrieval of 2 × √n values results in n × ((n − 1)! − x) possible allocations of √n non-sensitive values to√
n encrypted sensitive values, while (n − 1)! − x allocations exist when a queried non-sensitive value is assumed to
be the cleartext of a queried encrypted representation. Therefore, the probability of finding the exact allocation of the
non-sensitive values to encrypted sensitive value while considering a non-sensitive value is the cleartext of an encrypted
value is (n−1)!−xn×((n−1)!−x ) =
1
n .
Note: Handling adaptive adversaries. The above-presented approach can handle an honest-but-curious adversary,
who cannot execute any query, and the case when only the DB owner executes the queries on the databases. Now, we
show how to handle an adaptive adversary that can execute queries on the database based on the result of previously
selected queries. Note that an adaptive adversary can use any bin structure to break QB. She may ask some queries
on the non-sensitive data and some queries on the sensitive data. Her objective is to find a value that is common in
sensitive and non-sensitive datasets.
We explain with the help of an example that shows how an adaptive adversary breaks QB. Consider four sensitive
tuples having sensitive value, say s1, s2, . . . , s4, and four non-sensitive tuples having non-sensitive values, say ns1,
ns2, . . . , ns4. Suppose that si is associated with nsi , and all sensitive tuples are encrypted. A correct bin structure
(not considering permuted sensitive values) will be as follows: SB1: {s1, s3}, SB0: {s2, s4}, NSB1: {ns1, ns2}, and NSB0:
{ns3, ns4}.
Now, first see how an adaptive adversary can break QB, with the help of two queries: Consider the first query for
ns1. The adversary can ask the query for ns1, ns2, s1, and s2. The adversary will learn that the first and second encrypted
tuples are returned. However, she cannot know which of the tuple has an encrypted representation of s1.
Another query is for ns3, and she asks for ns1, ns3, s1, and s3. The adversary will learn that the first and third encrypted
tuples are returned. However, now, she will know that the first encrypted tuple has the encrypted representation is s1,
because it was retrieved in the first query for ns1 as well as in the second query.12 Thus, by observing access-patterns,
the adversary can know which two tuples are associated.
To protect this attack, we need to use a cryptographic technique, e.g., ORAM or secret-sharing that hides access-
patterns at the sensitive data. When using access-patterns-hiding cryptographic techniques, the adversary will learn only
the fact that two tuples are returned in response to any query. But it will not lead to any inference attacks. It is important
to recall that access-patterns-hiding cryptographic techniques are prone to output size attacks. Thus, when mixing these
techniques with QB makes them secure against output-size attacks. Note that we cannot use SGX-based solutions at
the encrypted data when dealing with an adaptive adversary, because the adversary can observe access-patterns due to
cache-lines and branch shadowing [33, 77].
Note: Security offered by existing cryptographic techniques vs QB. Papers such as [15, 34, 41, 42, 55] have
illustrated that formal security guarantees (e.g., as often shown in papers such as property preserving encryption [5, 12,
61] and symmetric searchable encryption [18]) does not prevent leakage through inferences. For instance, Naveed et
al. [55] showed that a cryptographically secured database that is also using an order-preserving cryptographic technique
(e.g., order-preserving encryption (OPE)) may reveal the entire data when mixed with publicly known databases.
Note that in our setting, the proposed technique, where the non-sensitive data resides in cleartext, would offer almost
no security without query binning. In particular, if the cryptographic technique used to store sensitive data reveals
access-patterns, then the adversary will learn about which ciphertext corresponds to which keyword simply by observing
the queries on cleartext. Such inferences are prevented by query binning. Also, note that unlike the security properties
of searchable encryption techniques (e.g., OPE, deterministic encryption, and symmetric searchable encryption), which
formalize security as indistinguishability from chosen keyword attack (IND-CKA1) [18] other than what can be inferred
from the permitted leakages, our scheme does not lead to any leakage due to the joint processing of sensitive and
non-sensitive datasets. Thus, QB is safe from inference attacks, and using QB in conjunction with any cryptographic
technique does not lead to any additional leakages.
4.3 A Simple Extension of the Base Case
Algorithm 1 creates bins when the number of non-sensitive data values13 is not a prime number, by finding the two
approximately square factors. However, Algorithm 1 may exhibit a relatively higher cost (i.e., the number of the
retrieved tuple) when the sum of the approximately square factors is high.
For example, if there are 41 sensitive data values and 82 non-sensitive data values, then Algorithm 1 creates
2 non-sensitive bins having 41 values in each and 41 sensitive bins having exactly one value in each (Line 4 of
Algorithm 1). Consequently, answering a query results in retrieval of 42 tuples. (We may also create two sensitive
bins and 41 non-sensitive bins containing exactly two non-sensitive values in each, resulting in retrieval of 23 tuples.)
However, the cost can be further reduced by a significant amount, which is explained below.
Example 5: (An example of QB extension — Algorithm 3). Consider again the example of 41 sensitive and 82
non-sensitive values. In this case, 81 is the closest square number to 82. Here, Algorithm 3, described next, creates 9
non-sensitive bins and 9 sensitive bins. By Lines 5 and 6 of Algorithm 1, sensitive values and associated non-sensitive
values are allocated, resulting in that a sensitive bin holds at most 5 values and a non-sensitive bin holds at most 10
values. Thus, at most 15 tuples are retrieved to answer a query.
Algorithm 3 description. An extension to the bin-creation Algorithm 1 is provided in Algorithm 3 that handles the
case when the number of non-sensitive values (|S | < |NS |) is close to a square number.14 Algorithm 3 first finds two
approximately square factors of non-sensitive values and the cost; Line 3. Algorithm 3 also finds a square number, say
z, closest to the non-sensitive values and the cost; Line 4. Now, Algorithm 3 creates bins using a method that results in
fewer retrieved tuples (Line 5). When Algorithm 3 creates bins using the square number closest to the non-sensitive
values (Line 6), the remaining non-sensitive values (i.e., |NS | − z2) can be handled by assigning an equal number of the
remaining non-sensitive values in the bins. Note that the sensitive and associated non-sensitive values are assigned to
bins in an identical manner as in Algorithm 1 (Lines 5-7).
12Of course, if the encrypted relation does not have any tuple having s1, then the adversary can learn that ns1 is not associated with any tuple.
However, this can be prevented trivially by outsourcing fake tuples having s1.
13Recall that we considered the case of |S | ≤ |NS |.
14The case of |S | > |NS | can be handled by applying Algorithm 3 in a reverse way.
Algorithm 3: An extension to the bin-creation Algorithm 1 for the base case, |S | < |NS |.
Inputs: |NS |, |S |.
Outputs: SB, NSB
1 Function bin_extension(S,NS) begin
2 Permute all sensitive values
3 x ,y ← approx_sq_factors(|NS |): x ≥ y; costd ← x + y
4 z ← closest_SquareNum(|NS |), costsn ← 2(z/√z)
5 if (costsn + ⌈(|NS | − z)/√z⌉ < costd) then
6 Execute Algorithm 1(S, z) and add (NS − z)/√z number of the remaining non-sensitive values in each
non-sensitive bins
7 else Execute Algorithm 1(S,NS)
4.4 General Case: Multiple Values with Multiple Tuples
In this section, we will generalize Algorithms 1-3 to consider a case when different data values have different numbers
of associated tuples. First, we will show that sensitive values with different numbers of tuples may provide enough
information to the adversary leading to the size, frequency-count attacks, and may disclose some information about the
sensitive data. Hence, in the case of multiple values with multiple tuples, Algorithms 1-3 cannot be directly implemented.
We, thus, develop a strategy to overcome such a situation.
Size attack scenario in the base QB. Consider an assignment of 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values to bins
using Algorithm 1; see Figure 3. Assume that a sensitive value, say s1, has 1000 sensitive tuples and an associated
non-sensitive value, say ns1, has 2000 tuples, while all the other values have only one tuple each. Further, assume that
each data value represents the salary of employees.
In this example, consider a query execution for a value, say ns1. The DB owner retrieves tuples from two bins:
SB1 (containing encrypted tuples of values s1 and s6) and NSB0 (containing tuples of values ns1, ns2, ns3, ns5, ns11); see
Figure 3. Obviously, the number of retrieved tuples satisfying the values of the bins SB1 and NSB0 will be highest (i.e.,
3005) as compared to the number of tuples retrieved based on any two other bins. Thus, the retrieval of the two bins SB1
and NSB0 provides enough information to the adversary to determine which one is the sensitive bin associated with the
bin holding the value ns1. Moreover, after observing many queries and having background knowledge, the adversary
may estimate that 1000 people in the sensitive relation earn a salary equal to the value ns1.
Thus, in the case of different sensitive values having different numbers of tuples, Algorithm 1 cannot satisfy the
second condition of partitioned data security (i.e., the adversary is able to distinguish two sensitive values based on the
number of retrieved tuples, which was not possible before the query execution, and concludes that a sensitive value (s1
in the above example) has more tuples than any other sensitive value) though preserving all surviving matches, and
holding Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 to be true.
In order for the second condition of partitioned data security to hold (and for the scheme to be resilient to the size
and frequency-count attacks, as illustrated above), sensitive bins need to hold identical numbers of tuples. A trivial way
of doing this is to outsource some encrypted fake tuples such that the number of tuples in each sensitive bin will be
identical. However, we need to be careful; otherwise, adding fake tuples in each sensitive bin may increase the cost, if
all the heavy-hitter sensitive values are allocated to a single bin. This fact will be clear in the following example.
s4, s5, s6
s7, s8, s9
SB0
SB1
SB2
s1, s2, s3
(a) The first way.
s9, s4, s2
s8, s6, s1
s7, s5, s3
SB0
SB1
SB2
(b) The second way.
Fig. 5. An assignment of 9 sensitive values to 3 bins.
Example 6: (Illustrating ways to assign sensitive values to bins to minimize the addition of fake tuples). Consider
9 sensitive values, say s1, s2, . . . , s9, having 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 tuples, respectively.15 There are
multiple ways of assigning these values to three bins so that we need to add a minimum number of fake tuples to each
bin. Figure 5 shows two different ways to assign these values to bins. Figure 5b shows the best way – to minimize the
addition of fake encrypted tuples; hence minimizing the cost. However, bins in Figure 5a require us to add 180 and 90
fake encrypted tuples to the bins SB0 and SB1, respectively.
Note that there is no need to add any fake tuple if the non-sensitive values have identical numbers of tuples. In that
case, the adversary cannot deduce which sensitive bin contains sensitive tuples associated with a non-sensitive value.
However, it is obvious that any fake non-sensitive tuple cannot be added in clear-text.
Before describing how to add fake encrypted tuples to bins, we show that a partitioning of sensitive values over SB
bins may lead to identical numbers of tuples in each bin, where a bin is not required to hold at most y values, is not a
communication-efficient solution. For example, consider 9 sensitive values, where a value, say s1, has 100 tuples and all
the other values, say s2, s3, . . . , s9, have 25 tuples each. In this case, we may get bins as shown in Figure 6. Note that the
bins SB1 and SB2 are associated with all the three non-sensitive bins while the bin SB0 is associated with only NSB0 (thus,
the given bins do not prevent the surviving matches). In order to associate each sensitive bin with each non-sensitive bin
(and hence, preventing all the surviving matches), we need to ask fake queries for bins ⟨SB0,NSB1⟩ and ⟨SB0,NSB2⟩.
s1
s2, s3, s4, s5
s6, s7, s8, s9
ns1, ns4, ns7
ns2, ns5, ns8
ns3, ns6, ns9
Sensitive bins Non-sensitive bins
SB0
SB1
SB2
NSB0
NSB1
NSB2
Fig. 6. An assignment of a heavy-hitter value but dropping surviving matches.
Adding fake encrypted tuples. As an assumption, we know the number of sensitive bins, say SB, using Algorithm 1
or 3. Here, our objective is to assign sensitive values to bins such that each bin holds identical numbers of tuples while
minimizing the number of fake tuples in each bin. To do this, the strategy is given below:
(1) Sort all the values in a decreasing order of the number of tuples.
(2) Select SB largest values and allocate one in each bin.
(3) Select the next value and find a bin that is containing the fewest number of tuples. If the bin is holding less than y
values, then add the value to the bin; otherwise, select another bin with the fewest number of tuples. Repeat this step,
for allocating all the values to sensitive bins.
(4) Add fake tuples’ values to the bins so that each bin contains identical numbers of tuples.
(5) Allocate non-sensitive values as per Algorithm 1 (Lines 6 and 7).
5 OTHER OPERATIONS
5.1 Join Queries
Let R be a parent relation that is partitioned into a sensitive relation Rs and a non-sensitive relation Rns. Let S be a child
relation that is partitioned into a sensitive relation Ss and a non-sensitive relation Sns. We assume that a tuple of the
relation Rs cannot have any tuple in the child table Sns. In order words, a sensitive tuple with a join key, say ki , of the
parent table Rs cannot have a non-sensitive tuple with the joining key ki in the non-sensitive child table Sns. However, a
non-sensitive tuple with a join key, say kj , of the parent table Rns can have a sensitive tuple with the joining key kj in
the sensitive child table Ss . Thus, in the partitioned computing model, the primary-key-to-foreign-key join of R and S is
computed as follows:
R ▷◁ S = (Rs ▷◁ Ss ) ∪ (Rns ▷◁ Sns) ∪ (Rns ▷◁ Ss )
Note that our objective is not to build a secure cryptographic technique for joining the sensitive relations. Thus,
we use any existing cryptographic technique, e.g., CryptDB [61], SGX-based Opaque [82], [8], [59], or [22] to join
sensitive relations. In addition, our objectives in joining two relations are:
15We assume that there are 9 non-sensitive values, and computed that we need 3 sensitive and 3 non-sensitive bins.
(1) Hide which sensitive tuples (of the relation Ss ) join with a non-sensitive tuple (of the relation Rns). For example,
we need to hide that t2 of Tables 8c should join with r2 of Table 8b.
(2) Hide which are the encrypted tuples of the output of (Rs ▷◁ Ss ) ∪ (Rns ▷◁ Ss ) associated with a non-sensitive tuple
of Rns ▷◁ Sns. For example, we need to hide that r2 of Tables 8b should join with t5 of Table 8d.
EID Name
r1 E101 Adam
r2 E102 Bob
r3 E103 John
(a) A relation R = Employee relation.
EeID Project Name
t1 E101 Security
t2 E102 Design
t3 E103 Code
t4 E103 Sale
t5 E102 Sale
(b) A relation S = Project relation.
Table 7. Two relations with their sensitive and non-sensitive tuples.
EID Name
r1 E101 Adam
(a) Rs .
EID Name
r2 E102 Bob
r3 E103 John
(b) Rns.
EeID Project Name
t1 E101 Security
t2 E102 Design
(c) Ss .
EeID Project Name
t3 E103 Code
t4 E103 Sale
t5 E102 Sale
(d) Sns.
Table 8. Sensitive and non-sensitive relations created from two relations of Table 7.
EID Name
r1 E101 Adam
r2 E102 Bob
(a) Rps.
EID Name
r2 E102 Bob
r3 E103 John
(b) Rns same as Table 8b.
Table 9. Sensitive relation with pseudosensitive tuples and non-sensitive relation, created from Rs = Employee relation
of Table 7a.
The DB owner-side. In order to join, the relations Rns and Ss , we follow the approach given in [56] that pre-computes
all the tuples of Rns that join with Ss . We call all such tuples of Rns as pseudo-sensitive tuples. In [56], the authors
found that the size of pseudo-sensitive data does not need to consider the entire Rns as sensitive. Particularly, at 10% of
sensitivity level, pseudo-sensitive data is only a fraction (25%) of the entire database.
In our join strategy (see Algorithm 4), before outsourcing the relations R and S , the DB owner finds pseudo-sensitive
tuples of Rns and keeps them with sensitive tuples of Rs , resulting in a new relation, denoted by Rps, containing sensitive
and pseudo-sensitive tuples (Line 3 of Algorithm 4). Now, the DB owner outsources (i) encrypted relations Rps and
Ss , and (ii) cleartext relations Rns, Sns (Line 5 of Algorithm 4). Additionally, the DB owner maintains the information
for bin-creation (Algorithm 1), which can be used to retrieve tuples after join. Thus, in our case, the join of R and S is
converted into the following join:
R ▷◁ S = (Rns ▷◁ Sns) ∪ (Rps ▷◁ Ss )
The cloud-side. We use any cryptographic technique for Rps ▷◁ Ss , and of course, join of the relations Rns and Sns is
carried out in the cleartext.
Note: non-foreign-key joins. The above strategy can also be extended to non-foreign-key joins by encrypting pseudo-
sensitive tuples of Sns with Ss . However, in this case, we need to avoid join of pseudo-sensitive tuples of Rns and Sns in
the encrypted domain, since these tuples will also join in cleartext. It can be done if the DB owner can add an attribute
to each sensitive relation to mark such pseudo-sensitive tuples.
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for execution join queries.
Inputs: Two relations: R(key,A1,A2, · · ·Am) and S(key,B1,B2, · · ·Bm′)
Outputs: R ▷◁ S
DB owner
1 Create Rs , Rns , Ss , and Sns
2 pseudo_sensitive_key[] ← {key ∈ Rns | Πkey (Rns) ∩ Πkey(Ss ) , ∅} // Retrieve all the keys in Rns that joins
with the relation Ss
3 Rps ← Rs ∪ (σkey∈pseudo_sensitive_key[](Rns )) // Retrieving tuples from Rns based on the the keys present in
pseudo_sensitive_key[] and merging them with the relation Rs
4 Encrypt Rps and Ss
5 Outsource encrypted Rps, encrypted Ss , cleartext Rns, and cleartext Sns to cloud
Cloud
6 joinsensitive_output ← Rps ▷◁ Ss , joinnon_sensitive_output ← Rns ▷◁ Sns
DB owner
7 if σAi=sj (joinsensitive_output , joinnon_sensitive_output) then
Execute Algorithm 2 // If the user is interested to fetch a tuple having sj in attribute Ai
5.2 Range Queries
Let A be an attribute on which we want to execute a range query. For answering a range query, we convert it into the
selection query, which can be executed using QB. However, a careless execution of QB for answering a range query,
which is converted into selection queries, may result in retrieval of either entire sensitive or non-sensitive data. For
example, consider 16 sensitive values, say s1, s2, . . . s16, and their associated non-sensitive values, say ns1, ns2, . . . , ns16,
where the sensitive value si is associated with the non-sensitive value nsi . Figure 7 shows a way to assign these values
to bins.
ns1, ns5, ns9, ns13
Sensitive bins Non-sensitive bins
NSB2
NSB1
NSB3
s5, s6, s7, s8 
SB1
SB2
SB3
s1, s2, s3, s4
s9, s10, s11, s12 
s13, s14, s15, s16 SB0
ns2, ns6, ns10, ns14
ns3, ns7, ns11, ns15
ns4, ns8, ns12, ns16 NSB0
Fig. 7. A way to allocate 16 sensitive and non-sensitive values to bins by following Algorithm 1.
Consider a range query for values s1 to s4. Answering this range query using QB will result in retrieval of the entire
non-sensitive data and the bin SB1. Our objective is to create bins in a way that results in a few tuple retrieval.
We describe a procedure for the case |S | ≤ |NS |, as the restriction is followed by Algorithm 1 in §4.1. We use the
example of 16 sensitive and 16 non-sensitive values of the attribute A. In order to answer range queries, the DB owner
builds a full binary tree on the unique values of the attribute A of the non-sensitive relation and traverses the tree to find
a node that covers the range. Thus, the DB owner retrieves tuples satisfying a larger range query that also covers the
desired range query. Note that many papers [19, 37, 48, 49] used the same approach of fetching a large range value to
satisfy the desired range value, and hence, preventing exact range values to be revealed to the adversary.
Full binary tree and bin creation. The DB owner first builds a full binary tree16 for the values of the attribute A of
the non-sensitive relation; see Figure 8 for 16 non-sensitive values. For each level of the tree, the DB owner applies
Algorithm 1 that takes nodes of the level as inputs. In particular, for the leaf nodes, i.e., level 0, Algorithm 1 takes 16
non-sensitive values, and produces 4 sensitive and 4 non-sensitive bins, by following Lines 3-7 of Algorithm 1.
At the level 1, Algorithm 1 takes 8 inputs that represent the nodes (N11,N12, . . . ,N18; see white nodes in Figure 8) at
the level 1, and each input value of the level 1 holds two non-sensitive values, which are child nodes of a level 1’s node.
For example, the node N11 holds two values ns1, ns2. For the 8 values, Algorithm 1 provides two non-sensitive bins
16The DB owner may also build a k -ary tree, where each node (except leaf nodes) contains k child nodes.
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Fig. 8. A full binary tree with some additional nodes for 16 non-sensitive values.
(each is containing 8 values) and four sensitive bins (each is containing 4 values). Let NSBi j be the jth non-sensitive bin
at the i th level, and let SBi j be the jth sensitive bin at the i th level. Thus, Algorithm 1 produces the following bins:
NSB10 containing ⟨N11,N12, . . . ,N14⟩,
NSB11 containing ⟨N15,N16, . . . ,N18⟩,
SB10 containing ⟨s1, s2, s9, s10⟩,
SB11 containing ⟨s3, s4, s11, s12⟩,
SB12 containing ⟨s5, s6, s13, s14⟩,
SB13 containing ⟨s7, s8, s15, s16⟩.
At level 2, Algorithm 1 takes 4 inputs that represent the nodes (N21,N22,N23,N24; see white nodes in Figure 8) at
the level 2, and each input value of the level 2 holds four non-sensitive values, which are grandchild nodes of a level
2’s node. For the 4 input values, Algorithm 1 provides two non-sensitive bins (each is containing 8 values) and two
sensitive bins (each is containing 8 values), as follows:
NSB20 containing ⟨N21,N22⟩,
NSB21 containing ⟨N23,N24⟩,
SB20 containing s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12,
SB21 containing s1, s2, s3, s4, s13, s14, s15, s16.
The DB owner follows the same procedure for the higher nodes, except the root node and child nodes of the root node.
Further, at each level except the root node, the child nodes of the root node, and the leaf nodes, the DB owner
creates additional nodes (see gray-colored nodes in Figure 8) that become parent nodes of the lower level’s two adjacent
nodes that do not have a common parent node. The algorithm given in [19] also uses these additional nodes for
answering a range query. For example, at the level 2 in Figure 8, the DB owner creates 7 such nodes. Let NSB′i j be the
jth non-sensitive bin at the i th level for these additional nodes, and let SB′i j be the j
th sensitive bin at the i th level for
these additional nodes. Algorithm 1 takes these 7 inputs and produces 2 non-sensitive bins (each is containing 8 values)
and 4 sensitive bins (each is containing 8 values), as follows:17
NSB′10 containing ⟨N ′11,N ′12, . . . ,N ′14⟩,
NSB′11 containing ⟨N ′15,N ′16,N ′17, 2 fake tuples⟩,
SB′10 containing ⟨s2, s3, s10, s11⟩,
SB′11 containing ⟨s4, s5, s12, s13⟩,
SB′12 containing ⟨s6, s7, s14, s15⟩,
SB′13 containing ⟨s8, s9, 2 fake tuples⟩.
Note. The self-explainable pseudocode in Algorithm 5, given in Appendix A, describes all the above steps of binary-tree
creation and bin-creation for range queries.
Bin retrieval and answering range queries. We provide two approaches: best-match method and least-match method,
for retrieving the bins in answering a range query.
Best-match method. This method traverses the tree in a bottom-up fashion and finds a node that covers the entire
range. Then, it retrieves a non-sensitive bin corresponding to this node and a sensitive bin. For example, if the query
17Note that the bins NSB′11 and SB
′
13 will ask to fetch two fake tuples each to maintain an identical-sized bin.
is for values ns1 to ns4, then by traversing the tree (see Figure 8) in a bottom-up fashion, the DB owner retrieves a
non-sensitive bin corresponding to the level 2, since the node N21 covers the entire range. Thus, the DB owner retrieves
the bins NSB20 and SB21. The self-explainable pseudocode in Algorithm 6, given in Appendix A, describes the best-match
method for answering range queries.
Least-match method. Assume a query is for values ns8 to ns12. The best-match method will find only the root node
that satisfies this query, and hence, it will result in the retrieval of entire non-sensitive or sensitive relation. Thus, we
propose a different method that breaks the range query into many sub-range queries and finds a minimal set of nodes
that cover the range. For example, the node N23 satisfies the query for value ns9 to ns12, and the leaf node having the
value 8 satisfies the query for the value ns8. Thus, the DB owner retrieves the bins NSB21 and SB20 to satisfy the query
for the value ns9 to ns12, and a sensitive bin and a non-sensitive bin to satisfy the query for the value ns8.
Aside: using additional nodes for answering a range query by following Algorithm 2. Assume a query is for values
ns4 to ns7. The best-match method finds only the root node that satisfies the query, and hence, results in retrieval of the
entire non-sensitive or sensitive relation. In contrast, the least-match method will break the query into sub-range queries,
such as (Q1) a query for ns4, a query for ns5, ns6, and a query for ns7, or (Q2) four selection queries one for each value.
The first query (Q1) will find the node N13 that covers the values ns5, ns6, and two leaf nodes one for ns4 and another
for ns7. This will result in retrieval of 28 tuples, such as one sensitive bin and non-sensitive bin for s4 (containing 4
tuples in each; see Figure 7), one sensitive bin and non-sensitive bin for s7 (containing 4 tuples in each; see Figure 7),
and the bin NSB10 (containing 8 tuples) and SB12 (containing 4 tuples) for answering the query for a range ns5 to ns6.
However, the second query (Q2) will be worse in terms of retrieving the tuples. It will result in the retrieval of the entire
non-sensitive data (see Figure 7).
In order to reduce the number of retrieved tuples, the DB owner can use the bins for the additional nodes. In
particular, the DB owner finds that the nodes N ′12 and N
′
13 that satisfy the value ns4-ns5 and ns6-ns7, respectively. Thus,
the bins NSB′10 (containing 8 tuples), SB
′
11 (containing 4 tuples), SB
′
12 (containing 4 tuples) can fulfill the query, and will
result in retrieval of 16 tuples.
Note that by using the bins for the additional nodes, one can answer queries for two adjacent nodes that do not share
a common parent in the original full binary tree, for example, values 8 and 9.
5.3 Insert Operation and Re-binning
QB does not allow outsourcing new tuples immediately as the new tuples arrive at the DB owner. The DB owner
collects enough number of tuples before outsourcing them, while the DB owner can either update the existing bins (by
increasing an identical size of each bin) or create all the new bins.
Particularly, the DB owner waits for new tuples until the DB owner collects new sensitive and non-sensitive values
equals to the number of existing sensitive and non-sensitive bins, such that each bin receives a new value.18 Let p and
q be the number of existing sensitive and non-sensitive bins, respectively. Note that when collecting p sensitive and
q non-sensitive values, the DB owner does not outsource these values if they will not become a part of each existing
sensitive or non-sensitive bin. Note that if the new values become a part of only one sensitive and one non-sensitive
bin, it reveals an association of values. Further, note that in outsourcing new tuples, the DB owner sends appropriately
encrypted sensitive data and cleartext non-sensitive data to the cloud. Thus, the cloud does not have access to any
sensitive data in cleartext, and hence, cannot launch an attack, if it is an honest-but-curious adversary, i.e., a passive
attacker, as we mentioned in §2.2.
However, the insertion of more values in existing bins incurs the overhead, as will be shown in Experiment 6 in §6.
Hence, Algorithm 1 is re-executed when the overhead crosses a user-defined threshold.
Now, we describe a procedure for outsourcing new tuples while using the existing sensitive and non-sensitive bins.
Let si and nsj be the value of new sensitive and non-sensitive tuples, respectively. When inserting new tuples, the value
si or nsj may exist in the outsourced data, and based on the existence of the values we classify them into four groups,
as follows: (i) old sensitive value (old-S): the value si exists in the outsourced sensitive data, (ii) new sensitive value
(new-S): the value si does not exist in the outsourced sensitive data, (iii) old non-sensitive value (old-NS): the value nsj
exists in the outsourced non-sensitive data, and (iv) new non-sensitive value (new-NS): the value nsj does not exist in
the outsourced non-sensitive data.
18In case, if the DB owner cannot collect new values equal to the number of bins, the DB owner may outsource fake values.
Based on the above-mentioned four types of values, the following four possible insert scenarios are allowed while
using QB.
(1) Inserting old-S and old-NS. This scenario is trivial to handle and does not require any update to the existing bins. The
DB owner outsources the encrypted sensitive tuples and non-sensitive data in cleartext.
(2) Inserting new-S and new-NS. The DB owner increases the size of each bin by one and inserts the values into existing
bins.
(3) Inserting old-S and new-NS. Inserting tuples of si does not require an update to the sensitive bins. The DB owner
checks whether the value nsj has an associated sensitive value or not in the outsourced data, by following Line 6-7 of
Algorithm 2. If the value nsj has an associated sensitive value, say sk , then the DB owner updates the non-sensitive bin
associated with a sensitive bin holding sk with the value nsj , according to Line 6 of Algorithm 1. If the value nsj has no
associated sensitive value, then the DB owner randomly inserts each non-sensitive value, one per non-sensitive bin.
(4) Inserting new-S and old-NS. This case is just the opposite of the previous case.
Note that all the four scenarios may require to outsource some fake tuples to have identical-sized sensitive bins. The
update/delete operation can also be done as an insert operation, where some additional tuples are outsourced to notify
the non-existence of tuples.
5.4 Conjunctive Queries
As defined, QB only works for selection queries with a single attribute in the search clause. Conjunctive queries that
contain several such conjuncts can also be supported in several ways. First, note that QB can be applied to multiple
attributes, say A and B, in a relation. During query processing, if a query refers to both attributes A and B, we can select
the more selective index and execute QB on it without inference attacks. Using QB on both attributes simultaneously,
however, unless done carefully, can lead to leakage. An approach to apply QB is to consider attributes that appear
commonly together in queries as a single (paired) attribute. Thus, values of this paired attribute would be attribute value
pairs on which QB can be applied. In general, the relation scheme will need to be partitioned into attribute subsets
on which QB can be applied. During query execution, the query processing algorithm will choose the corresponding
attribute subset that is most beneficial (will result in the least overhead) to execute the query. One such solution is to
create partitions of singleton attributes, but, then, conjunctive queries will run on a single attribute and reduce to the
first solution.
5.5 Handling Workload-skew Attack
The query execution and the corresponding accessed tuples (in the absence of an access-pattern-hiding scheme) allows
an adversary to deduce the frequency of queries, without knowing the cleartext value of the query keyword. Such
information coupled with background knowledge may reveal additional information to the adversary. For example, in
Table 1, if many queries access tuples t2 and t4, then the adversary may deduce that these two tuples may have identical
values in one or more attributes. Furthermore, if the adversary has background knowledge that John is the company’s
CEO (for which people ask many queries), then the adversary may deduce that t2 and t4 belong to John. We call such
an attack as workload-skew attack. We illustrate the workload-skew based attack (see Figure 9a) and also our approach
for addressing it for the base case of QB. In our proposed solution, we consider that a query predicate is either highly
frequent or infrequent. Our solution can be extended to the general case of different frequency query predicates by
creating groups of query keywords based on their query frequencies and allocating such groups to non-sensitive bins
such that the number of values in each bin is equal.
Figure 9a shows bins created by Algorithm 1 for 9 sensitive values and their associated 9 non-sensitive values.
Consider the values ns1, ns4, and ns7 occur most frequently in the query workload. Hence, in this example, the adversary
can trivially figure out by observing the sensitive tuple retrieval that only the bin SB0 has the associated sensitive values
with ns1, ns4, and ns7. The reason is that these four bins are retrieved more frequently compared to any other bin. Thus,
the adversary can determine that the encrypted values s1, s4, and s7 are associated with either ns1, ns4, or ns7. This is
more information than what the adversary had prior to the query execution since each sensitive value, e.g., s1, could be
any of the 9 non-sensitive values. However, it is hard for the adversary to find out which sensitive value out of the three
sensitive values of the bin SB0 is exactly associated with ns1, ns4, or ns7.19 In order to prevent the workload-skew attack,
19We are not assuming that a sensitive bin is not associated with each non-sensitive bin. But, because of heavy-hitter queries, the other bins are
retrieved less frequently than the bins having frequent selection predicates.
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Fig. 9. The workload-skew attack and solution under QB, where ns1, ns4, and ns7 are frequent predicates.
we need to allocate sensitive values carefully, thereby the sensitive values associated with frequent selection predicates
are distributed over all the bins.
Below, we provide a strategy for handling the workload-skew attack in QB. The idea is to find groups of either
x(= |NSB|) non-sensitive query keywords or y = |SB| sensitive query keywords that are queried almost equally, and
then follow the given steps to create bins appropriately. The self-explainable pseudocode in Algorithm 7, given in
Appendix A, and the following steps describe bin-creation method for the case of x frequent non-sensitive keywords.
The similar method can be used for bin creation in the case of y frequent sensitive keywords.
Step 1: Bin-creation to deal with workload-skew attack. In order to deal with workload-skew attack, we, first, need
to modify Algorithm 1 for bin-creation. The modified bin-creation algorithm (Algorithm 7, given in Appendix A)
contains the following steps:
(1) Create bins. Find two largest divisors, say x ≥ y, of |NS |, create NSB = ⌈|NS |/x⌉ non-sensitive bins, and x sensitive
bins (Line 3 of Algorithm 1).
(2) Assign non-sensitive values. Create groups, each of size x , of the frequent non-sensitive predicates, resulting in u ≤ NSB
groups. Assign the i th group to the i th non-sensitive bin. Now, assign all the remaining non-sensitive values, if any, as
follows: Find those non-sensitive bins that are not full, i.e., having less than x non-sensitive values. Then, assign the
remaining non-sensitive values to all such non-sensitive bins, such that each non-sensitive bin should contain at most x
non-sensitive values.
(3) Assign sensitive values. Assign the sensitive values associated with a non-sensitive value, say nsj = NSBz [j], where
0 ≤ j ≤ x − 1, to the jth sensitive bin at the zth position.
By following the above steps, Figure 9b shows 3 sensitive bins in the case of ns1, ns4, and ns7 as the frequent query
predicates. Note that the execution of QB using this strategy insists on retrieving all the sensitive bins for answering
frequent predicates. Thus, the adversary cannot determine which bin has a sensitive value associated with the values
ns1, ns4, or ns7.20
Step 2: Bin-retrieval — answering queries. To retrieve tuples satisfying a query keyword, we use Algorithm 2.
5.6 Enhancing Security-Levels of Indexable Techniques
We show how QB can be integrated with an indexable cryptographic technique, namely Arx [60] that uses a non-
deterministic encryption mechanism. In Arx, the DB owner stores each domain value v and the frequency of v in
the database. The technique encrypts the i th occurrence of v as a concatenated string ⟨v, i⟩ thereby ensuring that
no two occurrences of v result in an identical ciphertext. Such a ciphertext representation can then be indexed on
the cloud-side. During retrieval, the user keeps track of the histogram of occurrences for each value and generates
appropriate ciphertexts that can be used to query the index on the cloud. It is not difficult to see that Arx, by itself, is
susceptible to the size, frequency-count, workload-skew, and access-pattern attacks. The query processing using Arx as
efficient as cleartext version due to using an index.
The use of QB with Arx makes it secure against output-size, frequency-count, and workload-skew attacks. Of
course, QB takes more time as compared to Arx, since the time of |SB| searches cannot be absorbed in a single index
scan unless all |SB| values lie in a single node of the index. In the worst case, we traverse the index at most |SB| times,
unlike Arx, which traverses the index only once for a single selection query. It, however, significantly enhances the
20If there are less then x — which is the size of a non-sensitive bin — frequent predicates in a non-sensitive bin, then we need to send fake queries for
infrequent keyword of the bin, as frequent as frequent predicates, leading to retrieval of each sensitive bin. It will hide that the how many keywords
are frequent and infrequent in the bin.
security of Arx by preventing output size, frequency count, and workload-skew attacks. However, QB does not protect
access-patterns being revealed which could be prevented using ORAM. Determining whether coupling ORAM with Arx
mixed with QB or using a more secure cryptographic solution, e.g., secret-sharing, which uses a linear scan to prevent
access-patterns, with QB, more efficient (while QB with both the solutions strengthen the underlying cryptographic
technique) is an open question.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section presents experimental evaluations of PANDA. As we mentioned that PANDA does not need any specific
cryptographic technique for encrypted the data, we used PANDA with two cryptographic techniques/systems, such
as SGX-based Opaque [82] and multi-party computations (MPC)-based Jana [9]. We installed Jana on a machine
of 3.5GHz, Intel Xeon 8-core processor, 64GB RAM, 3TB disk and Opaque on a machine 3.5GHz, Intel i7 4-core
processor, 32GB RAM with SGX support, 350GB disk.21 We used Order and LineItem tables of TPC-H benchmark.
The DB owner stores sensitive and non-sensitive bins, whose size was propositional to the domain size of the searchable
attributes and independent of the database size. For example, for LineItem table, metadata for attributes OrderKey,
PartKey, and SuppKey were ≈3MB, ≈1MB and ≈0.1MB, respectively, while the size of LineItem table having 12M
rows was ≈1.5GB.
In the following, we show our experimental results: (i) We evaluate PANDA’s QB mixed with Jana on 1M LineItem
for selection and range queries.22 (ii) We evaluate PANDA’s QB mixed with Opaque on 6M and 12M LineItem for
selection, range, and join queries.
Technique 20% 40% 60% 80%
MPC-based Jana [9] (1M) 168 318 481 661
SGX-based Opaque [82] (6M) 26 42 59 78
Table 10. Exp 1: Time (in seconds) for executing a selection query, when mixing QB with Opaque and Jana at different
levels of sensitivity.
Exp 1: Selection query execution. Table 10 shows the time taken when using QB with Opaque and Jana at different
levels of sensitivity. Without using QB for answering a selection query, Opaque [82] took 89 seconds on 6M rows of
LineItem table and Jana [9] took 797 seconds on 1M rows of LineItem table.23 Note that the time to execute the same
query on cleartext data was only 0.0002 seconds. QB improves not only the performance of Opaque and Jana, but also
makes them to work securely on partitioned data and resilient to output-size attack.
Exp 2: Range query execution. We executed a range query on OrderKey column of LineItem table. Opaque and Jana
scan the entire data for answering any query. Thus, range query execution time was not impacted by the size of a range.
We selected a range of length 400. Table 11 shows the time taken by a range query on different sensitivity datasets using
QB mixed with Jana and Opaque. Note that the time taken by the same range query without using QB on 1M rows was
841s using Jana, and was 124s on 6M rows and 288s on 12M rows using Opaque. It shows that though fetching more
rows according to QB, it does not incur overheads in terms of the computation time.
Technique 20% 40% 60% 80%
MPC-based Jana [9] (1M) 170 319 483 688
SGX-based Opaque [82] (6M) 25 50 74 98
SGX-based Opaque [82] (12M) 49 98 146 216
Table 11. Exp 2: Time (in seconds) for executing a range query, when mixing QB with Opaque and Jana at different
levels of sensitivity.
Exp 3: Join query execution. We executed a join query mixed with a selection predicate covering 400 OrderKey of
Order and LineItem tables. We used Order table of 1.5M rows with 6M rows of LineItem table as smaller datasets, and
21Please note that we selected two different machines, because our intention is not to compare Jana and Opaque.
22Data insertion time was significant in Jana, thus, we used only 1M rows. Further, the current Jana version does not support joins in MPC.
23Note that in the conference version of this paper, the execution time of Jana was higher than the time taken in Table 10. The reason is that in this
paper, we used a newer version of Jana.
Order table of 3M rows with 12M rows of LineItem table as larger datasets. Table 12 shows the time taken by a join
query on different sensitivity datasets using QB mixed with Opaque. Note that the time taken by the same join query
without using QB was 154s on the smaller dataset and 364s on the larger dataset using Opaque. We also tried to execute
a join query without selection; however, Opaque does not support neither amount of rows.
Technique 20% 40% 60% 80%
SGX-based Opaque [82] (6M) 51 77 102 129
SGX-based Opaque [82] (12M) 102 155 207 284
Table 12. Exp 3: Time (in seconds) for executing a join query, when mixing QB with Opaque at different levels of
sensitivity.
Exp 4: Impact of communication cost. Since QB fetches more data than the desired data, it may affect the overall
performance. We fetched the maximum number of rows in the case of range queries. Particularly, in the case of 80%
of 12M LineItem table, we fetched ≈70,000 rows, whose size was ≈14MB. When using slow (100MB/s), medium
(500MB/s), and fast (1GB/s) speed of data transmission, the data transmission time was negligible.
Exp 5: Impact of bin size. Table 13 plots an average time for a selection query using QB with a different bin size,
which is in turn governed by the values of |SB| and |NSB|, respectively. We plot the effect of | |SB| − |NSB| | on retrieval
time and find that the minimum time is achieved when |SB| ≈ |NSB|.
| |SB| − |NSB| | 400 500 750 1,000
Time to execute a selection query on 20% dataset using Opaque 25 28 31 34
Table 13. Exp 5: Impact of bin-size.
Exp 6: Impact of insert operation. In the experiment, insertions were processed (as per the method, given in §5.3)
in batches of 10,000 and after each batch, selection queries were executed to determine the overhead due to insertion.
Finally, after 7 batches of insertion, Algorithm 1 was re-executed to recreate bins. Table 14 confirms that the query cost
increases but only marginally in the presence of insertion and (as shown by the last column) reduces by re-binning. In
Table 14, the first row shows the size of increasing data after each 10,000 rows’ insertion and the second row shows the
time in executing a selection on the dataset.
#inserted rows 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 Re-bin
Time to execute a selection query on
20% dataset using Opaque
27 28 29 30 31 32 34 30
Table 14. Exp 6: Impact of insert.
Exp 7. Number of fake tuples. Table 15 summarizes the number of fake tuples added for TPC-H LineItem data at
different levels of sensitivity. The reason of decreasing fake tuples when increasing sensitivity is that more real tuples
take place of the fake tuples. In general, the addition of fake tuples will adversely affect QB, especially, if data is
skewed. However, as shown in Tables 10, 11, and 12, QB remains significantly better compared to fully cryptographic
approaches at all levels of sensitivity despite fake tuples being added.
LineItem entire size 1% 5% 20% 40% 60%
6M 34244 34048 29568 24024 22736
Table 15. Exp 7: Number of fake tuple inserted due to QB.
7 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a prototype, PANDA, and its query processing technique, query binning (QB), that serves as a meta
approach on top of existing cryptographic techniques to support secure selection, range, and join queries, when a relation
is partitioned into cryptographically secure sensitive and cleartext non-sensitive sub-relations. Further, we develop a new
notion of partitioned data security that restricts exposing sensitive information due to the joint processing of the sensitive
and non-sensitive relations. Besides improving efficiency, while supporting partitioned security, interestingly, PANDA
enhances the security of the underlying cryptographic technique by preventing size, frequency-count, and workload-
skew attacks. As a result, combining PANDA’s QB with efficient but non-secure cloud-side indexable cryptographic
approaches can result in an efficient and significantly more secure search. Furthermore, existing indexable/non-indexable
cryptographic techniques that prevent access-patterns can also benefit from the added security that PANDA offers.
In future, one may extend the proposed technique for answering queries in different situations, such as the cases of
different relations that are encrypted using different cryptographic techniques and the case of a single relation that is
vertically partitioned into multiple relations that are encrypted using different cryptographic techniques.
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A PSEUDOCODE
Algorithm 5: Bin-creation algorithm for range queries.
Inputs: S and NS
Outputs: SB[∗, ∗, ∗]: Sensitive bins for each level of the tree. NSB[∗, ∗, ∗]: non-sensitive bins for each level of the
tree. In both SB[∗, ∗, ∗] and NSB[∗, ∗, ∗], the first index refers to the level of tree, and the second index refers to the
bin identity.
Variable Initialization: An array unique_ns[] ← allocate_distinct_nonsensitive_value(NS),
array_tree_node[]: An array to store all the nodes at a particular level of the binary tree.
Tree Node Initialization: TreeNode(covered_val[],TreeNode left_child,TreeNode right_child) // TreeNode is an
object class representing a node of a binary tree, where covered_val[] refers to an array of values covered
by the tree node, left_child refers to the pointer to the child tree node on the left, and right_child refers
to the pointer to the child tree node on the right side of the tree node.
1 Function create_binary_tree(unique_ns[]) begin
2 if |unique_ns[]| == 1 then
// This ‘if’ statement is the terminal condition of the recursive function execution and the
condition for edge case where the number of elements in unique_ns[] is 1
3 TreeNode tn← allocate(TreeNode())
4 tn.covered_val[0] ← unique_ns[0]
5 return tn
6 length ← |unique_ns[]| // Allocating the count of unique non-sensitive values to a temporary variable
length.
7 TreeNode root ← allocate(TreeNode())// Allocate an empty tree node.
8 for i ∈ (1, length) do root.covered_val[i] ← unique_ns[i]
// For a tree node, this statement stores all the values covered by the sub-tree rooted at this node
9 root.left_child ← create_binary_tree(unique_ns[1, length/2]) // Recursively calling create_binary_tree()
function with left half of unique_ns[] array.
10 root.right_child ← create_binary_tree(unique_ns[length/2 + 1, length]) // Recursively calling
create_binary_tree() function with right half of unique_ns[] array.
11 returnroot
12 Function create_sensitive_bin(TreeNode root, S,NS) // Allocating sensitive and non-sensitive values to bins.
begin
13 max_level ← height(root) // Finding the height of the tree created by function create_binary_tree()
14 for i ∈ (1,max_level − 2) do
// This ‘for loop’ is used to create bins for each level of the tree, except the root node and child
nodes of the root node. This ‘for loop’ starts from the leaf level of the tree.
15 array_tree_node[] ← retrieveNodes(root, i); // retrieveNodes(root, i) is a function that takes the ‘root’ node
of the tree and the level i of the tree, and then, returns all nodes at the i th level of the tree.
16 x ,y ← approx_sq_factors(|array_tree_node[]|); x ≥ y
17 |NSB| ← x , NSB ← ⌈|array_tree_node[]|/x⌉, SB ← x , |SB| ← y // Sensitive and non-sensitive bin
creation for the tree nodes of the i th-level of the tree
18 for (j,k) ∈ (1,NSB), (1, |NSB|) do NSB[i][j][k] ← array_tree_node[(j − 1) ∗ |NSB | + k]
// Allocating non-sensitive values to bins created for nodes of the i th-level of the tree.
19 for (j,k) ∈ (1,NSB), (1, |NSB|) do SB[i][k][j] ← allocateS(NSB[i][j][k])
// Allocating sensitive values to bins created for nodes of the i th-level of the tree.
20 for j ∈ (1, SB) do SB[j][∗] ← fill the bin if empty with the size limit to y
// Filling the sensitive bins for the i th level with the sensitive values that are non-associated
with any non-sensitive value.
21 return SB[i][∗][∗] and NSB[i][∗][∗]
Algorithm 6: Bin retrieval algorithm for range queries (best-match method) for non-sensitive values.
Inputs: [α , β]: The range of query values, where β > α and α , β ∈ NS. Tree: A binary tree created by Algorithm 5.
Outputs: SB: A sensitive bin; NSB: A non-sensitive bin.
Variable Initialization: iterations ← height(Tree). found ← false.
1 Function retrieve_bins_binary_tree(α , β) begin
2 for i ∈ (2, iterations) // Traversing the tree from the parent nodes of the leaf node to the root node in a
bottom-up fashion.
do
3 array_tree_node[] ← retrieveNodes(Tree.root, i)// retrieveNodes(root, i) is a function that takes the ‘root’
node of the tree and the level i of the tree, and then, returns all nodes at the i th level of the
tree.
4 for j ∈ (1, |array_tree_node[]| do
// This ‘for loop’ iterates over the nodes of array_tree_node[] array and determines if any node
covers the range of [α, β] completely.
5 len_covered ← |array_tree_node[j].covered_val[]|
6 if (array_tree_node[j].covered_val[0] ≤ α ∧ array_tree_node[j].covered_val[len_covered] ≥ β) // If
the range [α, β] is covered completely by covered_val[] array of the j th node at level i of the
tree, which is stored in array_tree_node[j].
then
7 NSB.append(array_tree_node[j].covered_val[∗]) // All the values covered by the node
array_tree_node[j] are added to the non-sensitive bin NSB.
8 found ← true; level ← i; bin_id ← j; Break
9 if found = true then Break
10 return SB[level, bin_id, ∗] and NSB
Algorithm 7: Bin-creation algorithm to deal with the workload-skew attack.
Inputs: NS: non-sensitive data, S: sensitive data.
Outputs: SB: sensitive bins; NSB: non-sensitive bins
Variable: frequent_non_sensitive{}: A set holding frequent non-sensitive keywords
1 Function create_bins_under_workload(S,NS) begin
2 x ,y ← approx_sq_factors(|NS |) : x ≥ y // Finding approximately square factors of the count of unique
non-sensitive values.
3 |NSB| ← x , NSB ← ⌈|NS |/x⌉, SB ← x , |SB| ← y // Creating sensitive and non-sensitive bins.
4 frequent_non_sensitive{} ← find_frequent(NS) // Find and allocate frequent non-sensitive values to the
set frequent_non_sensitive{}.
5 for (i, j) ∈ (1,NSB), (1, |frequent_non_sensitive{}|) do
NSB[i][j] ← frequent_non_sensitive[(i − 1) ∗ |NSB| + j] // Allocating frequent non-sensitive query
keywords to non-sensitive bins.
6 remaining_NS{} ← NS \ {v | v ∈ frequent_non_sensitive{}}// The set remaining_NS {} contains all the
infrequent non-sensitive values.
7 for i ∈ (1,NSB) do NSB[i][∗] ← fill the bin if empty with the size limit to x by taking values from
remaining_NS{} until remaining_NS{} = ∅
8 for (i, j) ∈ (1,NSB), (1, |NSB|) do SB[j][i] ← allocateS(NSB[i][j])
// Assigning sensitive values associated with non-sensitive values.
9 remaining_S{} ← S \ {v | v ∈ SB[∗, ∗]} // The set remaining_S {} contains all the sensitive values that are
not associated with any non-sensitive values.
10 for i ∈ (1, SB) do SB[i, ∗] ← fill the bin if empty with the size limit to y by taking values from remaining_S{}
until remaining_S{} = ∅
11 return SB and NSB
